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ABSTRACT
An abstract of the thesis of Cristin R. Mandaville for the Master of Science

in Geography presented November 21, 1995.

Title: A Swamp in the Desert: Theory, Water Policy, and Malheur Lake
Basin

Two perspectives are debated in current United States water policy
model development. One perspective calls for policy based on normative
values, such as an environmental ethic. The second perspective calls for
policy based on empirical, quantifiable values, for instance, economic
benefits and costs. This theoretical debate arises from differing assumptions
about what is problematic in contemporary water policy, and in turn gives
rise to many water policy models. Developing such models ostensibly
provides frameworks useful for developing real-world water policies. This
paper proposes that these water policy models are not in fact useful
frameworks for policy applications because the models do not accurately
account for the actual circumstances confronting water policy makers. In
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order to illustrate this hypothesis, a comparison of two water policy models
with a set of real-world policy circumstances is made here.
The two models, each representing one of the dominant theoretical
perspectives, are taken from David Lewis Feldman's Water resources
manaiement: In search of an environmental ethic (1991) and Peter Rogers'
America's water: Federal roles and responsibilities (1993). Feldman's model
was selected to represent the normative perspective, and Rogers' model is
selected to represent the empirical perspective. The real-world water policy
circumstances selected for this study are those of Malheur Lake Basin,
Oregon. This basin was selected because it provides the opportunity to
consider a range of water policy issues and problems. This study shows that
these two models do not offer adequate frameworks for applications. If
water policy models are to provide useful frameworks for applications,
model development must more closely consider actual cases.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Uncertainty has been a central concern in United States water policy
history (Holmes 1972; Holmes 1979). The desire to include a measure of
certainty in policy has led to policy model development. Two perspectives
have dominated this model development, particularly in contemporary
debate. One perspective advocates policy based on normative values, such
as a social contract based on an environmental ethic. The second perspective
calls for policy based on empirical values, for instance multi-objective plans
based on quantitative assessments of benefits and costs. The models are
based on differing assumptions about what is problematic in water policy.
This paper hypothesizes that water policy models do not provide
particularly useful frameworks for actual policy development, and that this
is because the models do not accurately represent the circumstances of the
real world.
This paper indicates that neither of the approaches evaluated herein
can be applied to actual water policy cases. Elements from both models are
found in the case studied, but the analysis indicates that even if the models
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were fully applied they would not result in achieving their stated objectives
in this case or elsewhere. Further, both models overlook factors critical to
water policy. In particular, the models fail to address crucial physical,
political, and legal factors in actual water policy. These failures are
illustrated by the circumstances of the case studied. Unless water policy
model development is made useful, the value of its continued debate is
questionable.
Both Feldman and Rogers define "water policy" as the entire complex
of policies, plans, rules, and factors involved in water resources use and
management. This definition is used in examining the case of Malheur Lake
Basin (the "Basin") as well. The major factors involved in Basin water policy
are considered in evaluating the Basin case.
THE MODELS
David Lewis Feldman's (1991) Water resources management: In
search of an environmental ethic and Peter Rogers' (1993) America's water:
Federal roles and responsibilities provide the models considered in this
paper. Both perspectives are concerned with several common water
resources problems, such as water quality protection and equitable
distribution of the resource and the benefits produced by it. Both authors
are also concerned with broader policy problems, including an abundance of
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involved institutions, regional administration, and intergovernmental
relations. Both focus on the United States, and include discussions of
economics, law, and politics in their models.
Nonetheless, the models are framed by the authors' very different
perspectives, and are based on very different assumptions of policy problems
and of what makes good policy. The normative perspective, represented in
this study by Feldman's model, calls for a broad-based social acceptance of
uncertainty regarding nature and natural values. The value of water must
be assumed to be inherent, rather than assigned by society, and greater
than its value as a commodity. Good water policy interferes minimally with
the natural hydrologic cycle. Social equity is also inherently valuable in this
perspective. The administrative system Feldman proposes consists of a
national system of decentralized regional water authorities, controlled
locally and based on watersheds.
The empirical perspective, represented in this study by Rogers'
model, focuses on accounting for that which is known. Good water policy
must consider water a commodity. Water distribution should be managed
through market-based strategies to ensure balance in fiscal budgets and in
water supply and demand. Environmental impacts of water policy should be
considered in terms of quantifiable values, benefits, and costs. Rogers
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proposes establishing central federal authority over regional water
administrations.
MALHEUR LAKE BASIN
A watershed basin in southeastern Oregon provides the case study
examined in this paper. The watershed is Malheur Lake Basin, as defined
by Oregon State Water Resources Department. Malheur Lake Basin
("Basin") water policy circumstances include a variety of physical and
human factors, some of which are unique to the Basin and some of which
can be generalized to other locations and situations. The factors considered
in this study are not limited to those that parallel the factors addressed in
the models. Instead, water policy in this Basin is described in terms of the
concerns that dominate water resources and policy debates in the Basin.
In the Basin, water policy is determined by a few primary players
based on certain assumptions. Agents with roles in determining water
policy include federal agencies, Oregon, consumers, and private interests.
Two broad interests, based on water usage, dominate Basin water policy.
First, there exists within the Basin an interest in maintaining current
economic, largely agricultural, activities and levels of productivity. Second,
there is an interest in preserving and improving a large area of the Basin
for wildlife habitat. The economy of the Basin is dominated by cattle
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ranching, which is generally considered to affect water quality and
wetlands' habitats negatively (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 1994). At the
same time, both residents and non-residents value the Basin wetlands and
wildlife highly. These apparently opposing values developed over the history
of European occupation of the basin. These assumptions sometimes lead to
conflicts over water policy.
Controversy over grazing, the condition of public rangelands, and the
effects on water quality began shortly after the arrival of the first ranchers
in 1868. Early settlers came in the 1870s to claim portions of the then vast
grassland valleys. The greatest influx of settlers to the Basin, largely
consisting of ranchers, occurred in the 1880s. By the turn of the century, the
grasslands were dramatically degraded. Progressive Era conservationism,
however, and concern for game and other migratory water birds, led to the
establishment of Malheur National Wildlife Refuge in 1908. The area of the
refuge was expanded in 1935 and again in 1941, and presently encompasses
about 184,000 acres of wetlands.
An interior drainage basin in a semi-arid region, the Basin provides

the opportunity to consider a wide range of water resources supply and
demand issues, including floods and water shortages, agricultural
productivity, and wildlife habitat preservation. The area often experiences
both water shortages and flooding within a single water year or over several
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years. Ground water provides an important resource for the wetlands and
municipal and domestic water supplies.
The key agents administering water policy in the Basin include three
federal agencies - the United States Forest Service ("USFS"), Bureau of
Land Management ("BLM"), and Fish and Wildlife Service ("USFWS") - and
the State of Oregon. These are key agents because the federal agents own
extensive land in the Basin, the USFWS holds senior water rights, and
Oregon owns the water resources in the state.
Federal lands include rangelands (managed primarily by the BLM),
forests (managed by the USFS), and wildlife refuges (managed by the
USFWS). Local consumers generally value both the rangelands and the
refuges highly. Thus, federal interests vary along the same lines as local,
private interests. The roles of local jurisdictions in directly shaping water
policy are minimal because of the state's authority over water and land use
decisions, and the degree of federal land ownership. Therefore, local
jurisdictions are not considered in this study.
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Until the 1950s, U. S. water policy emphasized large water projects
and structural basin development. This is generally considered to have
undermined broad-based national interests and long-term sustainability of
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water supplies (Gottleib 1988; Mann 1975; Maass 1951; North, et al. 1981;
Reisner 1986). Since the 1950s, an emphasis on improving water
administration by increasing quantitative certainty coincided with an
increasing concern with water quality and aquatic ecosystem health (Carson
1962; Ciriacy-Wantrup 1963; Cohon 1978; Eckstein 1958; Hanke and Davis
1973; James and Lee 1971; Maass, et al. 1962; Moore 1988; Moreell 1956;
Welsh 1985; White 1969; Wolman and Bonem 1971).
More recently, water policy models are recommended as a means of
preserving overall environmental quality, protecting biodiversity regionally,
and distributing an important resource equitably (Anderson 1983; Doppelt,
et al. 1993; Feldman 1991; Kellert, et al. 1991; National Research Council
1992; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 1989;
Reisner and Bates 1990; Rogers 1993). The specifics of these models differ,
but all call for increased public participation, for regional administration of
water resources, and for better coordination of objectives and methods
among agencies and organizations within and between water resources
regions.
Geographers involved in water policy modeling have included Gilbert
F. White, who, among his many endeavors, presented a classification of
strategies of United State water policy (White 1969), considered recent
wetlands policy developments (White 1991), and modeled the environmental
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impacts of the Aswan Dam (White 1988). Mathews (1984) applied
geographic analysis to a consideration of water resources and law. Regional
approaches have also played a role in geographers' analyses of water
resources (Muckleston 1990; Sewell 1965; White 1986). Wilkinson (1990)
modeled a water policy with a humanist approach for improving degraded
western lands. Water management and administration with a demand
management approach was modeled by Platt (1993), who also considered a
demand management approach as applied by Massachusetts (1995).
Water policy models are currently developed within the context of a
debate over two perspectives. The normative perspective calls for ideological
consistency of and between water resources laws, institutions, and activities
(Anderson 1983; Feldman 1991; Doppelt, et al. 1993; Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development 1989). Generally, this perspective
also advocates decentralization. Feldman's normative perspective follows
this tradition.
The empirical perspective claims to be based on feasibility (Rogers
1993; National Research Council 1992; North, et al. 1981). This perspective
relies heavily on economic assessment and market forces, and yet also
typically calls for strong central authority over the various interests in
water policy. Rogers' perspective is in alignment with this tradition.
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Models considered but not selected for this study were rejected on
various grounds. Anderson's (1983) model was deselected because it has
been over a decade since its publication. White's (1969) classification
scheme, though was rejected also for its publication date. Sewell's (1965)
study of floods and the Frasier River Basin was not considered for this study
because of the publication date. The criterion for selection of a recently
published model was based on the intent to critique the current state of
affairs within the water policy model debate.
Other models were rejected primarily based on the criteria of
geographic scale and topical scope. The models selected for this study were
required to address U. S. water policy comprehensively. Several models
were rejected for their narrow scale or scope, including White's (1988)
consideration of the Aswan Dam, Mathews (1984) consideration of
geography and water law, Wilkinson's (1990) consideration of Western U.S.
water resources concerns, and the National Research Council's (1990) model
for improving the quality of aquatic ecosystems. The Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development proposal for integrated, watershedbased water administration was rejected because of its wide geographic and
topical focus on a variety of international issues (1989).
Studies of Malheur Lake Basin water resources issues have focused
primarily on specialized scientific topics and the history of the ranching
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industry (Anonymous 1902; Brimlow 1951; French 1964; Fuste and
McKenzie 1987; Horton, et al. 1983; Hubbard 1975; Hubbard 1989; Paulson,
et al. 1991; Piper 1939; Rinella and Schuler 1992; Simpson 1987; U. S.
Army Corps of Engineers 1987; Vorderstrasse and Garst 1987). Fewer
studies have directly considered water resources policy and management
concerns (Duebbert 1969; Klingeman, et al. 1971; Reinhardt 1992).
The State Water Resources Board's Malheur Lake Basin Report
(1967) and Biennial Report (Oregon Water Resources Department 1992),

Oregon's Water Rights Systems (Oregon Water Resources Department 1994),
and the Strategic Water Management Plan (Oregon Water Resources
Department 1995) provide the background for the description of state water
policy in this paper.
Land use plans and program documents provide the background for
federal water policy. The wildlife refuge documents include plans for Hart
Mountain Antelope Refuge and Malheur Wildlife Refuge (Franklin, et al.
1972; U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 1982; 1985; 1990; 1992; 1994). The
largest area of land is managed by the Bureau of Land Management. Plans
and information regarding BLM holdings and programs are also considered
(U.S. Bureau of Land Management 1982; 1986; 1989; 1992a; 1992b; 1993a;
1993b; 1993c). The most recent public forest plans, though less important
for water policy in the basin than either the USFWS or the BLM documents,

,
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are also considered herein (U.S. Forest Service 1991). Typically, the USFS
and BLM interests regarding water tend to coincide, in favor of protecting
economic productivity, and are in opposition to the USFWS, which favors
protecting the environment.
POLICY MODELS VERSUS REAL-WORLD POLICY
As both Feldman (1991) and Rogers (1993) state, the best indication
of success in policy models is to be found in examinations of actual policy
cases. However, this study suggests that the model development debate
does not offer frameworks useful for actual policy applications. In order to
provide a framework useful for real-world policy applications, a water policy
model would need to offer concrete and practical strategies for improving
unpon existing policy. A useful model would encompass many of the general
factors involved in actual water policy situations. Broadly, such a model
would provide feasible strategies for water distribution, use, and hazard
mitigation. Determining feasibility would require a comprehensive
consideration of existing constraints on water resources. While a useful
model might consider issues including social equity or federal authority, it
would also include consideration of physical, political, and legal
circumstances. As indicated by the models considered herein, models which
overlook these circumstances or which are not feasible give existing
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constraints are not useful for applications. If water policy modeling is to do
more that perpetuate a theoretical debate, justify certain jobs, and leverage
certain political and academic platforms, it must bridge the gap between
theory and application.

CHAPl'ERII
TWO WATER POLICY MODELS

METHODOLOGY

Three steps comprise this study. First, the two opposing models are
described in terms of specific assumptions, objectives, and methods. Second,
a case in water policy is described in terms of its assumptions, objectives,
and methods. Finally, the terms of the models are compared to the terms of
the case in order to analyze the applicability of the models to the case. This
comparison is qualitative.
The criteria for selecting these models included the representation of
either the normative or the empirical perspective and fairly recent
publication. The criteria also required certain similarities between the
models, such as a national scale and attention to the concept of regional
management. These criteria were established in order to facilitate the
comparison to actual water policy circumstances. Malheur Lake Basin was
selected based on criteria including: existing water policy concerns,
representation ofU. S. water policy interests in the form of federal agencies,
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representation of state and local interests, and a regional approach to water
resources planning and management.
TWO WATER POLICY MODELS
Feldman and Rogers developed their models for water policy based on
how they each perceive contemporary water policy and on what they each
believe is the fundamental cause of water policy problems. Based on their
assumptions, Feldman and Rogers develop frameworks for improving water
policy, including specific objectives and methods for implementation. They
each claim that implementing their respective policy models will lead to
more socially-beneficial outcomes than are found in existing policy.
Although each author explicitly grounds his model in a philosophical
perspective, each also focuses on a primary question that is essentially
geographic. In debating questions about normative versus empirical
perspectives in water policy, they both consider what scales are best for
water administration. Feldman recommends increased pluralism in U.S.
water policy, and Rogers recommends centralization. Both recommend
regional administration of water, under jurisdictions other than the states.
In order to compare the models with Malheur Lake Basin, it is necessary to
distill the key components of each: assumptions, objectives, and methods.
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FELDMAN'S WATER POLICY MODEL
Assumptions
Feldman identifies the fundamental cause of problems in water
resources policy as capitalism (Figure 1). His assumption is that capitalism
defines a normative, socio-political ethic that is inherently detrimental to
humans and their environment. The ethic of capitalism rests on core values
"antithetical to conservation and preservation" (Feldman 1991, p. 205).
Feldman believes capitalist motives impede individual, social, and natural
teleological development. Such values, according to Feldman, include a
commoditization of nature, an assumption of humanity's right to exploit
nature, and unlimited individual freedoms: "[t]he ... willingness to rank
individual economic liberty ... above the broad range of human needs"
(Feldman 1991, p. 15) obviates the development of harmony within society
and between society and nature.
Economics. One primary outcome of the capitalist ethic is that
frequently the market is presumed to be the best means of making political
decisions. Policy that results from the behavior of the market does not
consider "non-economic values, ... local concerns and tradition, ...
promises made to regions and ... the impact of policy upon present and
future generations" (Feldman 1991, p. 2). Feldman contends that a water
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ASSUMPTIONS
Capitalism Is the root cause of water policy problems.
ECONOMICS
- Market does not make best policy decisions
- Public Involvement Is restricted by market
- Benefits and costs not distributed equitably by market
LAW
Water rights are property rights, preventing:
- Balanced supply and demand
- Protection of ground water
- Water rights transfers
POLITICS
- Narrow Interests are represented
- Decision-making Is Inconsistent
- Accountability Is lacking
OBJECTIVES
Replace capitalist ethic with an environmental ethic,
providing rules for:
- Fair and equitable use
- Full payment for use
- Use that does not result In harm
METHODS
Increase pluralism
- Create polltlcal-hydrologlc regional (watershed)
administrations
- Establish structural efficiency rule
- Include representation of all Interests
- Require payments to be In proportion to benefits
Gain broad-based acceptance of social contract
- Based on decision-making rules, not end-states
- Formalizing prlnclples of the environmental ethic

Figure 1. Feldman's water policy model.
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policy based on market forces inevitably encompasses only narrow interests.
Such policy does not satisfy a criterion of justice, and promotes only the
pre-existing preferences of engineers, planners, and water resource
beneficiaries.
Related to the public faith in market-driven decisions is confidence in
the use of benefit-cost analyses for measuring the efficiency of policies.
Feldman finds the prevailing concepts of efficiency, and the use ofbenefitcost analysis to justify and support these concepts, troubling. Benefit-cost
analyses lead to several specific problems. First, they are intended for use in
comparing and evaluating policy alternatives. Feldman claims that
development and consideration of such alternatives rarely occurs in reality.
Second, only a few dominant interests are represented, both in the
conducting and accounting of such analyses. Third, the criterion of
structural efficiency, which requires that the benefit of one person does not
result in harm to another person, is rarely considered. Benefit-cost analysis
is problematic because it "inadequately accounts for environmental impact
and ... it ignores the range of concerns people have about the uses of
natural resources" (Feldman 1991, p. 6).
By failing to consider structural efficiency and to transcend market
forces, water policy that is rooted in capitalism derives short-term benefits
for limited interests, claims Feldman. The existing system obscures rather
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than elucidates the whole public interest, and is both exploitative and
inequitable. There is no incentive in the existing system to pursue less
costly (in terms of both economic and non-economic costs of exploitative use)
and more equitable water policy alternatives, alleges Feldman. Distributive
politics and the use of water resources to develop regional economies,
through regional water projects, embody this approach to water policy. In
addition to regional inequities, such projects intend to optimize economic
efficiency, not structural efficiency, by developing multiple-use objectives.
These multiple uses, however, only address the particular interests of
certain beneficiaries, rather than the interests of all those responsible for
paying for, or otherwise incurring a loss due to, the construction of the
projects.
Law. Founding water policy on capitalism and its ethical principles
affects realms beyond merely the economic. Expressing this ethic in the
application of property rights to water becomes problematic in riparian and
appropriative systems alike, and is particularly thorny in ground water law.
The property rights approach to water law leads to many outcomes, few of
which encourage conservative use or equitable distribution of the resource
or the benefits derived from the resource.
Feldman alleges there are three primary failures of the property
rights systems of water law. First, supply and demand, the physical
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attributes of water available for use and water used, are not balanced.
Second, ground water is not adequately protected. Feldman does not
mention that ground water laws evolved prior to scientific understanding of
the resource, and thus overlooks that this failure might be one of science or
policy rather than oflaw. The third failure of water law is that water rights
transfers are not typically feasible. The legal failures, claims Feldman, are
exacerbated by the "fragmentation of authority" and legal rules, which
differ from state to state (Feldman 1991, p. 27).
The failure of water law systems to balance use and availability
results from a fallacy that water supplies for multiple concurrent uses are
available (Feldman 1991). Thus, according to Feldman, while the economics
of water rest on the assumption that markets are good decision-makers, the
law of water assumes water supplies are fairly abundant, renewable, and
available for many simultaneous uses. Doctrines of reasonable and ·
beneficial use, and correlative rights, do not overcome discrepancies
between use and availability, claims Feldman. These legal principles are
limited due to monitoring problems, unclear definitions of the reasonable
and beneficial use doctrines, and the highly competitive environment
surrounding the water rights systems. Monitoring problems are not detailed
by Feldman, but might be assumed to include the lack of measurement of
the use and waste of water, such as water metering.
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The second failure of water law lies in ground water rules that are
based on the premise that ownership of an area of land means ownership of
that land surface and of everything under it. This leads to what is called the
'power of the pump,' whereby landowners pump as much ground water as
they can with whatever size of pump they buy. This is now tempered in
some states by doctrines of reasonable use and correlative rights, or by
appropriative permitting rules for ground water in some cases. Reasonable
use and correlative rights doctrines limit each individual's use by
disallowing harm to neighboring water users' and may allow water use only
in proportion to the area of land owned. As with prior appropriation systems
oflaw, a few states (including Oregon) require permits to use ground water,
with some uses (domestic or stock watering) excluded. These permits are
issued according to roughly the same principles as surface water rights
under prior appropriation. Feldman argues ground water laws, nonetheless,
rarely foster equitability and generally prevent protection of aquifers from
overdrafts and contamination.
Finally, neither riparian nor appropriative systems provide adequate
standards and rules for the legal transfer of water rights. Typically, water
rights are legally transferable only with the sale of the land to which they
are tied, either by geography (under riparian systems) or by permit (under
prior appropriation systems). This failure of water law is illustrated by two
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specific problems with prior appropriation systems, claims Feldman. Under
drought conditions, junior appropriators receive no water while senior
appropriators receive full allocations, which is a social inequality inherent
to the system. Further, there is a disincentive for conservative use under
appropriative systems due to the so-called 'use-it or lose-it' doctrine.
Effectively, this is a statute of limitations on the non-use of a water right,
and after a certain period of non-use transpires, the water right reverts to
the state. This encourages water rights holders to use all of their allocated
water, even if not needed, in order to retain the valuable right. This also
discourages conservation and equitable distribution.
Thus, Feldman contends, due to these failures of a water law founded
on principles of private property, and based on the capitalist ethic, equitable
and sustainable uses of water are prevented rather than encouraged.
Specifically, water use exceeds availability, ground water quality and
quantity declines, and water rights are not easily transferable to allow for
redistribution in times of shortages, excesses, or to achieve alternate
preferred objectives.
Politics. Feldman describes many problematic outcomes of capitalist
water policy in the political arena. These outcomes include: exclusion of
certain interests from decision-making, ad hoc decision-making, a lack of
coherency in policy, a lack of accountability for policy, and a proliferation of
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self-interested institutions. Because they are inherent in the existing
capitalist structure, Feldman does not think that even major institutional
reforms can resolve or improve these situations.
The form of democracy that results from the capitalist ethic, which
Feldman criticizes, is characterized by numerous competitive, selfinterested groups, and a popularly-held belief that this method of decisionmaking (as with market forces) leads to preferable results. The political
arena assumes participants are defending and trading-off preferences. The
actual result, says Feldman, is a "politically narrow struggle for
bureaucratic survival and interest group aggrandizement" (Feldman 1991,
p.3). The process excludes, obscures, and marginalizes the true, broad-based
public interest, entrenches participants in narrow agendas, and does not
allow the consideration of a wide range of policy alternatives.
Feldman further points to the ad hoc nature of policy as being one
problematic result of an assumption of capitalism. Situations that are
visible and promoted by vocal, politically-prominent, interests receive
attention. Decisions are typically justified by utilitarian criteria: the most
benefit for the most people at the least economic cost and in the shortest
time. However, argues Feldman, long-range planning, which considers noneconomic values and broad public interests, is not a part of this ad hoc type
of decision-making (Feldman 1991, p. 7). Comprehensive planning may be

23
more coherent, Feldman concedes. However, the historically dominant
method of addressing water-related concerns has been without "regard to
systematically established national priorities based upon a political theory
of the environment" (Feldman 1991, p. 10). Without such grounding in a
political theory of the environment, and domination instead by a capitalist
ethic, most comprehensive planning efforts have failed to improve upon ad
hoc planning, Feldman believes.
The same forces that prevent the installation of coherency in water
resources policy prevent the designation of responsibility and enforcement
of obligations by beneficiaries to compensate non-beneficiaries for losses and
impacts. There is no obligation for the beneficiaries of water resources
policies to be accountable for impacts to human and environmental needs
outside their narrow interests. Feldman believes that not only should
beneficiaries be obligated to repay benefactors, but also that it is not
justifiable for individuals "to refuse to allow the needs of society to restrict
their use of certain resources" (Feldman 1991, p.14).
Feldman also argues that there are simply too many institutions
involved in water resources, each with different interests and jurisdictions,
leading to fragmented, over-lapping authority, constituency-based decisionmaking, and a bureaucratic goal of institutional survival. These institutions
include agencies at all levels of government. Any policy-making or
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politically influential organization is also a candidate for this group. These
institutions construct a culture of experts, such as engineers and
economists, and base decisions on expert-opinions, further obviating public
participation. Public participation is sacrificed, and public interest obscured,
by the proliferation of these institutions on the political landscape.
The false beliefthat institutional reforms will lead to improved policy
is coupled with the problems of numerous involved institutions, claims
Feldman. Interagency conflicts continue when reorganization is attempted,
because the values of organizational members do not change with
centralization, consolidation, or coordination. Feldman believes that
differences are intensified when efforts are made to achieve consensus
through reforms or mandates. Feldman asks whether institutional reform
and increased consensus will provide the most flexibility and innovation in
policy development.
Objectives and Methods
An alternative to the capitalist ethic forms the foundation of

Feldman's objectives and methods. This alternative is an environmental
ethic, and the basic objectives of this ethic are:
... (1) the rights of users to fair and equal use of the water, (2)
the interdependency of natural resources, based upon the
character and disposition of these resources in a region as well
as historical patterns of development, and (3) the obligations of
users to abide by the rules for allocation of water and of the
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costs of locating, supplying, cleaning and transporting water...
. (4) No change in use, allocation, or development would be
permitted unless it could be demonstrated that the change that
makes some members of society better off would not make
others, whether in the same or another water resources region,
worse off (Feldman 1991, p. 196).
The main impediment Feldman identifies to the development of a normative
environmental ethic is the pre-existing normative capitalist ethic that
encourages the view of water as a commodity with a primary value in
advancing individuals' and civilizations' wealth.
Feldman's believes that establishing an ethically defensible natural
resources policy is a crucial task facing society. Further, Feldman states
that:
... an ethically defensible natural resources policy is one that
satisfies a broad range of human needs, from survival and
biological exigency to an enlightened existence in harmony
with one's inner character, with others, and with nature.
Implicit in the assumption is that a theory of justice should
encompass natural resources as well as people ... In order to
ensure the satisfaction of this range of human needs, the
teleological development of people requires an enlightened
regard for the distribution, use, and potential for abuse of
natural resources. In addition, nature is intrinsically valuable
in its own right because of its own telos, or purpose. Every
natural resource has a place in the unity and order of the
physical world (Feldman 1991, p. 21-22).
Water policy should account for both environmental and social costs
incurred by water use and management as well as represent all possible
interests. Feldman leaves many terms undefined. For instance, what he
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means by "enlightened," or the "needs" of humanity and nature for
teleological development, is not clear.
Feldman's model poses four objectives of such an ethically defensible
water policy and two primary methods for achieving these objectives.
Increasing pluralism is the first method, and this consists of establishing a
viable administrative system ofpolitical-hydrologic regions. The second
method, establishing a social contract, provides rules and procedures of
decision-making.
Feldman credits Gilbert White with the idea that flexibility and
innovation are fostered in an environment rife with opposing views and
interests. He expands on this idea with the claim that flexibility,
experiment, and innovation are encouraged with a high degree of
administrative pluralism. Feldman believes that it is not contradictory to
both increase pluralism and establish a normative, environmental ethic. In
fact, he believes his normative ethic would nurture pluralism, unlike the
capitalist ethic. Specifically, Feldman recommends creating regional
political-hydrological administrations with rules and decision-making
procedures and authority. These would replace existing state systems of
water law and administration. Replacing existing state systems of water
law, Feldman believes, would resolve the failures he perceives in those
systems.
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Feldman proposes the division of political-hydrologic regions based on
watershed basins, with boundaries and sizes defined with a consideration of
both cultural and natural factors. These regions would necessarily provide
for inclusion and expression of a wide range of competing values. Further,
the regional approach would allow for the definition of"real, discernible
needs based upon our intuitive concepts of justice (clean, safe, fairly
abundant water priced affordably so as to cover the cost of supply and
transit)" (Feldman 1991, p.50). The true broad range of public interests is
accommodated by the pooling of available resources within regions for the
mutual, equitable benefit of all users. Feldman believes that this is not
possible under the existing state systems because these were developed out
of the capitalist ethic.
Feldman's regional administrations would contain operations
subsystems similar to publicly-owned utilities. These administrations would
be guided by rules set forth in a social contract. The social contract, either
tacitly accepted or in constitutional form, sets forth the rules for decisionmaking within the regional system (Feldman 1991, p. 73). Feldman derives
these rules from his environmental ethic. First, residents are entitled to
certain specific rights and obligated by certain duties. Such rights include
fair distribution and equal treatment, and duties include full payment of
costs incurred by water users and beneficiaries. Water subsidies supported
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by non-beneficiaries and non-users would cease. Also, rules for determining
and maintaining the regional boundaries would be included. These would
accommodate both hydrological and cultural patterns, such as watershed
characteristics and settlement patterns. While actual decisions would be
flexible over time, the rules for decision-making would be fairly static.
Perhaps most importantly, the rules" ... would [serve to] establish the
priorities for allocation, the management of water resources, and the
criteria for construction projects and for modifications to river basins and
ground water resources" (Feldman 1991, p. 78). These rules would require
that any viable plan or decision meet the criteria of structural efficiency.
Feldman's model emphasizes specifying rules and principles, rather
than empirically measurable end-states. His approach is qualitative, not
quantitative. Thus, the regional system would be both flexible and coherent.
For example, instead oflocking water rights to specific uses and locations, a
standard set of water allocation rules would provide for changing needs and
circumstances. Water distributions would not exclude some users during
shortages, nor would certain new uses be excluded because historic overallocations are legally binding.
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ROGERS' WATER POLICY MODEL

Assumptions
Rogers' view of the fundamental problem in water resources policy is
very different from Feldman's. Rogers locates the primary problem of water
policy with the public's perception of water resources issues and the
unrealistic expectations created by those perceptions (Figure 2). His goal in
developing his model is to illustrate "a ... policy stance that will allow the
myriad current and proposed ... activities to work together coherently
without sudden major shifts" (Rogers 1993, p. 7). Further, he believes that
education, of adults as well as children, is the only way to fully overcome
the problems that currently arise in water resources policy. Unlike
Feldman, he believes the crucial response to problems in policy is
institutional reform at all levels of government, combined with improved
definition of agency roles and responsibilities.
Unrealistic expectations for water supplies arise from increasing
aftluence in society. Rogers claims that:
Aftluence leads first to a rise in the quantities of water used by
each individual and his or her support systems, and second to a
change in attitude toward the environment, from a strictly
utilitarian concern for short-term human survival to an
appreciation of the need for long-term sustainability of the
aquatic ecosystem (Rogers 1993, p. 2).
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ASSUMPTIONS
Public perception Is the root cause water policy problems.
ECONOMICS
- Unrealistic quality and quantity expectations
- Beneficiaries do not pay complete costs
- Inaccurate water pricing causes water shortages
LAW

Federal legislation Is required preventing:
- Ground water contamination
- Non-point source pollution
POLITICS
- Public and environmental health compete (and should not)I
- Infrastructure definition (and accounting) do not Include
maintenance and operations
- lnteragency relations are conflicting, paralyzing policy
processes
OBJECTIVES
- Balance the water budget: fiscal and supply-and-demand
- Define governmental roles, consolidate and centralize water
administration
- Define and enforce water quality standards
- Educate the public
METHODS
- Centralize water administration
- Create meaningful regions such as problem-sheds
- Estasblish a federal water council
- Account for complete costs of water
- Privatize water; manage water as a commodity
Figure 2. Rogers' water policy model.
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Further, costs increase per unit as the demands and expectations increase;
likewise, the amount of benefit derived from ever-increasing spending at
some point begins to decrease. Rogers does not think it is reasonable to
spend money eliminating every minor contaminant from water, whether or
not harmful, when it might be more productively spent improving other
areas of public health.
Like Feldman, Rogers develops an argument for his model of water
policy in terms of current economic, legal, and political concerns. Far less
critical of the current state of affairs in water policy than is Feldman,
Rogers states that he believes the existing system to be generally successful,
though needful of reforms.
Economics. Rogers points to high and steadily increasing water costs
as an indication of unrealistic public expectations for water supplies and
water quality. Total spending for water resources development through U.
S. history, he estimates, has been about $400 billion. To maintain water
supplies and quality at current standards, spending from 1985 through the
end of the millennium would require an additional $200 billion. Total
spending on water resources and related programs in 1992, including
federal, state, local, and private expenditures, was approximately $84
billion, of which about one-third was federal funds. Much of this money is
expended assuring that water is a renewable resource. This raises two
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questions crucial to Rogers: 'how much is enough?,' and 'how clean is clean
enough?'
Another problematic economic issue under the existing system is the
method by which costs are shared. Rogers believes cost sharing
requirements are a good start. However, costs continue to accrue
disproportionately to federal and state authorities, rather than directly to
local beneficiaries. This allows for involvement of higher authorities in the
direction oflocal water projects, but nonetheless is not entirely equitable.
Inequities between who pays for and who gains from water resources can
lead to highly undesirable consequences, according to Rogers.
One consequence of such inequities, when combined with inaccurate
water pricing, is water shortages. Rogers believes water shortages are
primarily an economic, rather than a physical, phenomenon:
Improper pricing of water, rather than inadequacy of supply, is
most often the chief culprit in water shortages. Charging users
what water really costs to produce, manage, treat, deliver, and
dispose of after use is so sensible a concept that it hardly
merits elaboration. But the fact is that few water delivery
systems follow such a policy today (Rogers 1993, p. 185).
This perspective illustrates Rogers' belief that water policy and
administration comprise an industry, whether managed as one or not. AB an
industry based on a particular commodity, it is subject primarily to market
forces and only secondarily to natural forces. Rogers acknowledges that
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market and natural forces are interwoven, but he does not account for
natural factors, such as floods or droughts, in his model.
Law. Rogers focuses on the regulatory role of federal laws in
mitigation of environmental problems, rather than on the state riparian and
prior appropriation systems oflegal property rights in water, as did
Feldman. Rogers accepts a property rights system of water law, and
advocates privatization of some currently public functions and a regulated
free-market approach to water policy. Nonetheless, he believes treatment of
water with a strictly property rights-free market system is not adequate. He
points to the success of federal regulation in reducing point-source pollution
over the last two decades as an example of the potential for effectiveness of
using environmental regulations to constrain market forces.
Rogers believes that two water regulation challenges currently face
Congress. First, ground water protection has not been legislated. Though
considered urgent for some time, ground water use and contamination
remain largely unregulated. Ground water supplies are increasingly relied
upon, yet no national objectives exist to lead states towards implementation
of ground water plans and regulations. Second, the federal government does
not provide adequate leadership to state and local governments by directing
efforts to control non-point source pollution. Lacking federal legislation,
limited action will occur at a local level to improve situations regarding
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ground water and non-point source pollution, Roger alleges, because
subjectivity and local interests cannot be effectively transcended by local
jurisdictions.
Politics. Politics is the realm, according to Rogers, wherein society
sets and attempts to implement goals. Rogers indicates several problematic
and neglected areas in the political realm. The primary weakness in each of
the areas is in the poor definition of standards, priorities, and government
roles. The areas Rogers discusses are: public versus environmental health,
infrastructure, education and research, and intergovernmental relations.
The public's expectations for environmental quality fall into the
political realm, as do questions of public health; both connect to water
quality and quantity issues. As expectations for improvements in
environmental quality and public health increase, so expectations for water
quality and renewability also increase. However, Rogers indicates that
priorities in environmental quality and public health, though often related,
are sometimes in opposition; he notes that various programs sometimes
compete for funds. Public awareness of both connections and competition
between environmental quality and public health must be raised to begin
addressing questions of 'how much is enough,' and 'how clean is clean
enough.' Clear definition of and improved consensus about these questions
will go far towards setting widely acceptable priorities for water.
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Water infrastructure, including delivery and waste water treatment
systems, navigation and irrigation structures, hydropower, and flood
control, is not adequately maintained, claims Rogers. Urban delivery and
sewage systems are frequently leaky and of insufficient capacity for stormwater run-off. Rural delivery systems and irrigation practices are often
wasteful; new technology might provide significant improvements.
Irrigation runoff is by-and-large not regulated and monitored. Dams,
reservoirs, and related large water-project structures are costly to build and
maintain. Deciding to keep infrastructure in good repair, determining who
pays the costs, and overseeing maintenance projects is the responsibility of
political agencies. However, governments frequently do not prioritize this
maintenance, nor do they consistently appropriate adequate funds to
support sound infrastructure in good repair.
Rogers claims this stems from a lack of the political will and
consistency to set and hold to consistent long-term goals. All too often, the
background clamor of relatively short-term demands and crises supersedes
long-term policy decisions. Rogers believes it is critical to maintain longterm policy objectives, and to minimize capitulation to short-terms demands
inconsistent with these objectives.
Government agencies at all levels establish information systems and
perform research activities, yet lapse in coordinating those efforts, asserts
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Rogers. Nor is information readily accessible and widely available. In the
water policy arena particularly, centralization and coordination are
important to ensure public access to and awareness of current research and
findings, as well as to minimize agency overlap and redundancy, and to
improve inter-agency communications.
Of particular concern to Rogers are jurisdictional conflicts and interagency relations. Rogers refers to differences between physical regions on
one hand and political regions on the other hand. An example is that the
geographic variation of hydrology and climate factors across the nation does
not correspond directly to the geographic variation in jurisdictions with
authority over water resources, the states. This is fundamentally a question
about the best scale at which to manage water resources, and Rogers
proposes federal-level policy-setting combined with local implementation
and enforcement. This differs from the existing system because states were
not established based on locally meaningful cultural and natural factors,
claims Rogers.
Further, the existing system lacks a single central authority over
water policy that might settle conflicts of interest through establishing
national priorities and procedures. A lack of physically and culturally
"meaningful regionalism" (Rogers 1993, p.14) contributes to problematic
intergovernmental relations, believes Rogers. Tension between different
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levels of government (federal, state, and local) arises from differences in
scale as well as from different interests and preferences. Friction also occurs
among agencies and organizations at the same general level.
The increasing number of well-organized interests involved in water
policy and management also contributes to difficult interagency relations.
Though such an increase in interests may be legitimate, Rogers believes it
can paralyze the political process. Effective negotiations and compromises
are wrought more slowly, if at all, with increased participants, particularly
when those participants disagree. Problems in inter-agency relations due to
the plurality of organized interests are exacerbated by a lack of incentives
for coordinated behavior and consensus. Instead, competition and selfinterest of agencies and organizations are often heightened through a policy
process involving too many players and too little coordination.
Objectives and Methods
Objectives and methods of Rogers' model emphasize institutional
reforms. The objectives include: 1) complete payment of water costs by
beneficiaries, 2) definition and centralization of administrative roles, 3)
definition and enforcement water quality standards, and 4) improvement of
public education about water issues. The first objective Rogers describes
rests on the premise that costs of water must be completely paid for by
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users. Rogers vehemently opposes the concept of treating water as a public
good that should be free. Balancing expenditures for water with revenues
from water is also crucial to Rogers' proposal. Rogers mentions the issue of
equitable distribution of water resources, although he does not explain how
such equitability would be achieved. Social equity is not addressed as a
policy objective or standard. Lacking such an equity objective or standard,
Rogers is susceptible to the criticism that his pay-for-use objective is
regressive. Feldman's structural efficiency requirement in his payment-foruse objective allows him to dodge this criticism.
Rogers alleges that if federally or state held water "creates a benefit,
[then] the ... government has a claim" (Rogers 1993, p. 189) and that the
"costs [of water] should be recovered in the price paid by beneficiaries"
(Rogers 1993, p. 193). Rogers recommends eliminating the gap between
federally subsidized rates paid by local beneficiaries and actual market
rates. All users, regardless, should pay equal, full market prices for the
same resources. Costs might vary based on origin of the supply and
transportation costs, for instance, but not on user characteristics
(municipal, agricultural, e.g.). Accurately pricing water obviates the need
for subsidies. Relevant external costs internalized will yield accurate water
pricing, and thus the incentive to conserve. Rogers also recommends
charging for direct use of resources and facilities and for equipment used to
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enjoy those resources and facilities. For example, a surcharge would accrue
on prices of boats and fishing equipment, and user fees would apply on
federal and state waters.
Further, under Rogers' framework, the term 'infrastructure' would
expand. Institutional, operational, and maintenance attributes would be
included with elements of the physical water infrastructure, such as sewers,
mains, dams, and channels. The organizational attributes would be subject
to direct charges or taxes, as would the physical attributes. For example, a
direct tax on water use of 5 cents on 1,000 gallons of drinking water and the
same tax on waste water would raise more than 1.5 billion dollars each
year. The revenues raised from charging for the true costs of water would be
kept in a depository, a "National Water Trust Fund" (Rogers 1993, p. 189).
This institution might also be responsible for guaranteeing the preservation
of other capital assets, such as the water infrastructure. Rogers suggests a
federal water council manage this fund.
Rogers advocates water markets that are governed by national
standards for ensuring equitable transfers and least-cost sources of supplies
to users. Whereas the existing system limits water allocations to specified
uses and locations, a water market would allow for flexible water
allocations. Water rights could be transferred according to regulated
transactions. Federal regulations would guarantee that transactions result
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in a net balance or increase in social benefits, Rogers claims. This would
allow water to be managed as the commodity Rogers believes it is.
However, Rogers cautions:
... the market approach is far from well accepted in the United
States today. It can run afoul of the concept that water should
be freely available to all, and the in-stream water for fish and
wildlife in particular, should be provided at no cost. The
practice of making a profit from water sales, or even building a
sinking fund from revenue surpluses in anticipation of future
needs, is foreign to many purveyors, offensive to many of their
constituencies, and frequently illegal. And proper pricing can
encounter a firestorm of political protest, since the ultimate
step is apt to be at least a doubling of prevailing rates (Rogers
1993, p. 186).

The next objective Rogers discusses is the need to clearly define,
centralize, and coordinate government roles and responsibilities.
Government agencies and organizations would be consolidated and
coordinated by a central, federal-level water agency. Such an agency would
perhaps fall under the direction of the president, and be organized as a
council of appointees. The organization would be structured so council
members would be free of other agency responsibilities and independent of
competing agencies' missions. This council would formulate national water
policy, coordinate water resources planning and management, and manage
the federal water research and information programs. Such a national
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council would be established by legislation and would direct regional water
authorities.
Regions must be meaningful to be effective, however. Because social
development takes place in a political, economic, and cultural context,
rather than, for instance, along watersheds and according solely to
hydrology, watershed management is not the framework Rogers favors.
Instead, regions comprising a complex set of physical and cultural
characteristics are in order. Establishing meaningful regionalism in water
administration is challenging because of the spatial differences between
administrative jurisdictions and natural watersheds. This difference should
be resolved for efficient and effective management, according to Rogers.
Meaningful regions must be determined by local concerns, in accordance
with state water law and federal regulation. For example, problem-sheds,
regions aggregated based on specific water resources problems, would be
more meaningful regions than watersheds, according to Rogers. In such
problem-sheds, Rogers proposes a regional system of water policy and
planning that considers cultural factors and natural factors that are of
value and concern to humans. Defined at the local level, problem-sheds
would be aggregated regionally, and would fall under the authority of the
proposed federal water council. The relationship of problem-sheds to
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existing local, state, and federal jurisdictions is not defined in Rogers'
discussion.
Rogers refers obliquely to consolidating existing government agencies
and organizations. The proliferation of water-related agencies and
committees in the executive and congressional branches of government is a
serious concern of Rogers'. However, the closest he comes to making a
specific recommendation is to say that:
... the obvious solution in each instance is a measure of
consolidation: reform of the committee structure in Congress,
and reorganization of the executive branch agencies .... the
next best approach would be efforts at improved coordination
among joint authorizing committees of the House and Senate
(Rogers 1993, p. 17).
Centralization of the institutions conducting research and
maintaining data is also a part of this objective. Decision-making at all
levels of government requires accessible, current, coordinated, and adequate
information on water and policy topics. This would be achieved by
establishing and funding a centralized water research and information
program, directed by the federal water council. This program would
coordinate existing research programs as well. Additionally, some public
education programs, in the form of public forums held regionally, would be
one means of disseminating information from the researchers to the public.
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Protection of water quality through legislation is the third objective of
Rogers' model. Specific issues he believes require immediate attention are:
assessment and protection of ground water, wetlands, in-stream flows, and
water quality. Rogers believes wetlands' issues in particular have good
potential for unifying administrative efforts. This goal is to be achieved by
clarifying reasonable standards, enacting federal regulations, and
implementing these locally. Water quality regulations must be evaluated in
conjunction with assessments of true costs and benefits.
The final and fourth objective of Rogers' model addresses the problem
of public perceptions and unrealistic expectations. Rogers believes a
national public education program, coordinated by the federal water council,
would begin to resolve the fundamental problem of public expectations
exceeding practical reality. Such an education program must contain not
only curriculum modifications directed towards school children, but also
programs directed towards adults. Professionals and individuals involved in
water resources administration and management in particular must be
provided with sound and complete information in order to make good
decisions.
Rogers' program consists of "a series of regional forums ... held
around the nation to link the federal water administrators with their state,
local, and private counterparts" (Rogers 1993, p. 209). These forums would
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be open to the public, and sponsorship would be encouraged from nongovernmental organizations, including civic, research, and professional
organizations. It would provide an avenue for public education and also
would expose federal policy-makers to regional concerns and issues. Several
specific and important issues would comprise forum topics, including: water
law, water quality, land use, drought, financing, ground water protection,
non-point source pollution, wetlands, and in-stream flows.
Many of the concerns Rogers raises, objectives he poses, and methods
he recommends are similar to those of Feldman. For example, both are
concerned with balancing the expenditures and revenues of water and with
ending water subsidies. Both seek to minimize interagency conflicts and the
paralysis that results from existing bureaucratic systems. Also, both
envision a new regional system as the best method of improving water
administration and management.
However, Rogers' and Feldman's models diverge in several significant
ways. Feldman believes that the consideration of water as a commodity is
highly problematic and instead water must be assessed by non-economic as
well as economic values. Rogers believes that increasing the involvement of
the market in water resources administration and management will solve
economic problems. Feldman thinks that increasing pluralism and authority
locally will break up the institutionalized conflicts of interest, thereby
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resolving the problem. Rogers thinks that interagency and interorganizational conflicts can be resolved by centralization and coordination
federally. Feldman models a regional system of water administration based
on primarily natural factors, with some consideration of cultural factors.
Rogers models a regional system of water administration based on cultural
factors and factors of nature as they are assigned value culturally. Finally,
Feldman's model relies primarily on ethics and Rogers' model ultimately
relies largely on economics.

CHAPrERIII
MALHEUR LAKE BASIN WATER POLICY
Rendering the water resources and water policy of Malheur Lake
Basin ("Basin") in terms of simplified physical and human factors will
enable the comparison with Feldman's and Rogers' models. These factors
include a consideration of the assumptions, objectives, and methods for
water policy development and implementation, but do not exclude
additional descriptive information necessary to an understanding of Basin
water policy. The physical factors are of central importance to Basin water
resources and policy concerns. In many ways, Basin hydrology and climate
determine the character of Basin water policy. Human activities, of course,
are also a central determinant of Basin water policy.
PHYSICAL FACTORS OF WATER POLICY
Malheur Lake Basin is the largest hydrologically-closed basin in the
State of Oregon, and contains wide, high plains, gently-sloped valleys,
steeply-walled canyons and high mountains. The peak elevation is 9,670
feet at Steens Mountain, and the lowest elevation is 4,025 feet in Alvord
Desert (Figure 3). The Basin combines features of both deserts and
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Malheur Lake Basin, Oregon
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wetlands. It contains one of the largest inland wetlands in the nation, and
one of the most important nesting grounds for the greater sandhill crane
(Rinella and Schuler 1992). Two national wildlife refuges, several
wilderness study areas, and a Wild and Scenic River are only a few of the
important reserves and recreation areas in the Basin. Yet, the primary
economic activity in the Basin is cattle ranching.
The two land uses, ranching and wildlife habitat, often compete for
water resources in the Basin. This results from both physical and cultural
factors. Conflicts between the two uses are central to water policy
development by policy makers, as are physical constraints on water
resources. Physical factors playing a role in policy development include
climate and hydrology. Cultural factors focus on the two primary values of
ranching and wildlife.
Climate
Malheur Lake Basin climate is arid to semi-arid. Two seasons
dominate the weather in the Basin. Winters are long and relatively wet, and
summers are short and very dry. Average annual precipitation for the water
yearsl from 1944 to 1990 was 9.87 inches. Both winters and summers tend

Water years date from October through September; data based on
measurements taken at the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge
Headquarters climate station.
1
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to have extremely variable temperatures. Freezing can occur during any
time of year. As a closed basin, water exits the Basin almost exclusively
through evaporation.
Monthly averages of precipitation for water years 1944 through 1990
indicate that, despite a secondary peak in May and June, most precipitation
in the Basin occurs between November and January (Figure 4). Mapping
mean annual precipitation isohyets (Figure 5) indicates the effects of
topography on the distribution of precipitation across the Basin, with lower
elevations averaging less than half the precipitation of high elevations.2
Average monthly temperature minimums and maximums
demonstrate the ranges of temperature variability (Figure 6),which are not
unusual in arid environments, but, combined with a short growing season,
make many agricultural activities difficult. The seasonal variation of
temperature and precipitation is hydrologically important. Since
precipitation in the Basin occurs largely between November and January,
about 40 percent falls as snow across the entire Basin, and 65 percent as
snow at high elevations (Columbia-North Pacific Technical Staff 1970). The
secondary precipitation peak, between May and June, coincides with

Precipitation and temperature data measured at the Malheur
National Wildlife Refuge Headquarters climate station (climate division 07;
43 17" N, 118 50' W; elevation 4,109 feet) are available from 1943. Figures
and statistics in this paper are based on these data, from 1943 through
1989, unless cited otherwise.
2
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snow-melt. Therefore, most surface run-off and virtually all ground water
recharge occurs during the spring thaw (Fuste and McKenzie 1987).
Storage of Basin waters in lakes leads to high levels of evaporation
(Rinella and Schuler 1992). Mean annual lake evaporation is estimated to
be between 39 and 42 inches (Columbia-North Pacific Technical Staff 1970).
Additional significant evaporation occurs from soils in areas where the
water table is within 10 feet of the surface, with .5 inches evaporation per
day possible where the water table lies within two feet of the ground surface
(Columbia-North Pacific Technical Staff 1970).
Other factors affecting evaporation include humidity and irrigation.
For example, at Malheur Climate Station average relative humidity in July
commonly varies from 50 percent in the early mornings to less than 20
percent in the afternoon. In winter, relative humidity averages 80 to 90
percent at Malheur Climate Station. Evaporation in the summer is
considerably higher in summer than it is in winter (Columbia-North Pacific
Technical Staff 1970). Flood irrigation of arable land diverts over 100,000
acre-feet each year from Basin rivers to fields (Rinella and Schuler 1992;
State Water Resources Board 1967). This flooding coincides with the hottest
summer months, exacerbating losses to evaporation (Rinella and Schuler
1992).

"
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Hydrology
Basin hydrology factors important to water policy consist of surface and
ground water distribution, yields, and water quality. Topography plays a
large role in both surface and ground water flow systems, which in turn
dictate water distribution and yields. Ground water recharges in upland
areas and discharges in the lowlands, along the hydraulic gradient, with a
regional flow system generally following topography (Gonthier 1985;
Leonard 1970). With only limited and small scale control structures in the
Basin, surface water in the Basin also flows from high elevations to low
elevations.
Topography also affects seasonal variations in run-off. For instance,
average monthly stream-flow values for the Silvies and Blitzen rivers
confirm that the highest run-off occurs between March and June, following
the spring snow-melt (Figure 7). Responsiveness of the Blitzen River to runoff lags behind the Silvies River because the Blitzen River drains a smaller
area at higher elevations than does the Silvies River. The responsiveness of
ground water to changes in climate, both seasonally and long-term, remains
to be studied.
Surface Water Distribution. Although perennial streams discharge
most run-off in the Basin, the majority of the area of the Basin is drained by
intermittent streams into playa lakes. Some intermittent and all perennial

~
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streams drain into perennial lakes, such as Malheur and Alvord lakes.
Measurements regarding the quantity and quality of discharge from
intermittent and minor streams are not available. Research and water
policy in the Basin emphasizes two perennial streams (Silvies and Blitzen
rivers) and the Harney Valley lakes (Malheur, Mud, and Harney).
The Silvies River begins in the Strawberry Mountains and loses
about 5,000 feet in elevation on its run to Harney Valley. Because of the
volume of discharge, elevation change, and geomorphology, the Silvies River
is the likeliest candidate for structural development in the Basin. The
Silvies River has the highest yields of the Basin's streams, with an average
annual run-off ranging from about 30,000 acre-feet to 220,000 acre-feet over
the last 50 years. Silvies River contributes about 25 percent of the total flow
into Malheur Lake, which, despite its greater total run-off, is far less than
the contribution of the Blitzen River. This is because the majority of water
is diverted from Silvies River, for agriculture, before reaching the lake
(Hubbard 1975; Fuste and McKenzie 1987).
The Blitzen River originates high on Steens Mountain, draining
glacially-carved valleys of the south-central Basin to Malheur Lake.
Tributaries include those on the north and west faces of Steens Mountain,
from Little Blitzen River to Fish, Krumbo, McCoy, Kiger, and Riddle creeks.
One-fourth of the area draining Steens Mountain contributes fifty percent of
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the total discharge of the Blitzen River. This flow peaks primarily in May
and June, and continues as snow-pack in high elevation canyons melts
during early summer. These relatively late flows usually provide a good
irrigation supply throughout the summer, without requiring artificial
storage. The Blitzen River has more subdued run-off peaks than the Silvies
River (Figure 7). With average annual run-off ranging from about 20,000
acre-feet to about 100,000 acre-feet over the last 50 years, total annual
discharge is less than the Silvies River. However, the Blitzen River
contributes about 65 percent of the total inflow to Malheur Lake (Hubbard
1975).
Water levels of Malheur Lake fluctuate both with the variations in
run-off received and with variations in direct contributions from
precipitation. The one percent contribution from ground water, including
from Sodhouse spring, is not as variable (Hubbard 1975). Run-off into the
lakes averages about 190,000 acre-feet, after consumptive uses. If the lake
level exceeds 4,093.5 feet above mean sea level, it overflows into Mud Lake,
and ultimately Harney Lake, through the Narrows. Average surface area of
all three lakes is approximately 260 square miles. In very dry years, such as
1889, 1924, and 1934, both lake beds, and Mud Lake, are dry. The
extremely wet years of the early 1980s increased Malheur Lake levels to a
record of 4,102 feet above sea level in 1985 (Fuste and McKenzie 1987).
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Data on the chemical, biological, and sediment composition of
streams are limited and available for only scattered sites and times. Based
on data available, the water quality of the streams seems to be generally
excellent (Columbia-North Pacific Technical Staff 1970; Rinella and
Schuller 1992). Phillips and Van Denburgh (1971) questioned the effects of
agricultural uses of gypsum (calcium sulfate), for soil conditioning, on
surface water quality. Hubbard (1975) found bottom-sediment samples
showing minor quantities of pesticides and trace elements. Concern for
effects of concentrations, in particular, of arsenic and boron on wildlife led
to a USFWS study in 1985-1986 that showed minimal concentrations of
these elements in lake area biota (Rinnella and Schuler 1992). Rinella and
Schuler (1992) found that, during 1988-1989, arsenic and boron exceeded
Environmental Protection Agency criteria for health protection or for
beneficial uses in some lake water and biota samples. However, because
these concentrations were not found in all samples it was determined they
were not probably causing significant harm.
Of the lakes in the Basin, Malheur has the best water quality
(Columbia-North Pacific Technical Staff 1970; Rinnella and Schuler 1992).
The lakes generally have much higher total dissolved solids than the
streams that enter them (Columbia-North Pacific Technical Staff 1970;
Rinnella and Schuler 1992). Fuste and McKenzie (1987) noted that, in 1984
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and 1985, concentrations of dissolved solids increased from Malheur to Mud
to Harney lakes. They further observed that dissolved solids in Harney
Lake derived from thermal springs near the lake and from evaporation.
Ground water. The Basin's aquifers are believed to be hydraulically
inter-connected and highly interactive with surface water systems.
Drawdown of ground water supplies is a concern, as this might lower water
levels in ponds, lakes, and marshes (Columbia-North Pacific Technical Staff
1970; Rinella and Schuler 1992; State Water Resources Board 1967).
Recharge is estimated to be in close balance with discharges to pumping,
springs, lakes, irrigated fields (where the water table is shallow), deeprooted plants, and evaporation (Columbia-North Pacific Technical Staff
1970). These factors make development of ground water resources a delicate
matter.
Three geologic units in the Basin have primary hydrologic
significance as aquifers (Figure 8). A sedimentary unit underlies much of
Malheur Lake Basin, with basin-fill and alluvium deposits along existing
stream channels, lake beds, and basin floors, to depths of about 250 feet.
These sediments include deposits of unconsolidated to semi-consolidated silt
to gravel. Underlying that tier are volcanics with interbedded sedimentary
deposits, forming the second major unit. These two aquifers outcrop in over
half the area of the Basin, and may contain up to 80 percent of the total
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ground water resources in the Basin. Basalt flows, underlying the second
unit, outcrop in the Basin's eastern uplands and comprise the third main
unit (Baldwin, et al. 1992; Columbia-North Pacific Technical Staff 1970;
Gonthier 1985; Leonard 1970).
Although water quality varies widely from site to site, ground water
with under 1,000 milligrams per liter total dissolved solids 3 is estimated to
be between 75 and 80 percent of the total available supply. Basin ground
water can have total dissolved solids in excess of 5,000 milligrams per liter
(Columbia-North Pacific Technical Staff 19970). Because boron and sodium
are toxic to crops, levels of these should be, but are not always, monitored
closely in ground water used for irrigation. This applies particularly to
areas near lakes, where surface and ground water alike tend to have higher
concentrations of dissolved minerals (Columbia-North Pacific Technical
Staff 1970; Fuste and McKenzie 1987).
Supply Problems: Shortaies and Surpluses. The primary and most
common Basin water supply problems are floods and droughts. These result
from variable flows seasonally and over years. Flows during the spring
season cannot always be used to maximum benefit; inadequate storage
facilities mean that the water simply flows to Basin lakes. The late season

Levels recommended by the Environmental Protection Agency are:
500 mg/I for drinking water; 700 mg/I for irrigation; and to 7000 mg/I for
large livestock animals (Freeze and Cherry 1979, pp. 386-388)
3
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shortages inevitably cause all interested parties concern. For Malheur
National Wildlife Refuge, problems include a need for draining certain
areas, dividing Malheur Lake into smaller, more attractive habitat units,
developing junior water rights in Silver Creek Valley, and managing to cope
with the extremely variable water supplies (Army Corps of Engineers, 1957;
Bureau of Sport Fisheries 1962; Wallsworth 1995).
Water shortages are common annually in the Basin, during the
middle to late summer and early fall. Flooding, to some degree, also occurs
commonly, during the spring run-off peaks. This variability of supply
challenges Basin water users and managers. Persistence of dry or wet years
poses additional problems. Persistent dry periods occurred between 1928
and 1941, 1959 and 1964, and 1987 and 1988; particularly wet years were
recorded in 1897, 1952, and between 1981and1985 (Paulson, et al. 1991;
Fuste and McKenzie 1987; Army Corps of Engineers 1957). Basin residents
and officials note that the drought which began in 1987 did not actually end
until 1991(Bentley1995; Wallsworth 1995).
Floods occur typically between March and May, when snow melts and
spring rains fall, but while the ground is often still frozen. Floods primarily
affect the more densely populated area around the cities of Burns and
Hines. Urban street networks (Figure 9) are particularly vulnerable to
floods, and sometimes residents are cut off from access to services. Flood
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control structures upstream of the urban area on the Silvies River have not
been built, primarily because effects on Malheur National Wildlife Refuge
are expected to be negative (Wallsworth 1995). Flood waters in the Basin's
valleys are used for irrigation when possible, with overflows discharged
ultimately to the lakes. About 50,000 acres are flooded annually; most is
crop land. Flood irrigation structures have, in some cases, exacerbated
problems from flooding. Roads and rail, fields, ranches, residences, and
wildlife habitat are damaged when it floods.
The most notable flood on record began with high precipitation levels
in 1982 and peaked in 1985 with unprecedented lake levels. On June 27,
1984, Malheur Lake surface elevation reached an historic record high of
4,102.4 feet, where a normal annual maximum is 4,093 feet (Rinella and
Schuler 1992, p. 12). At this lake level, more than 170,000 acres were
submerged, and Malheur, Mud, and Harney lakes were joined into one lake
(Hubbard 1989). Previous lake surface area maximums, between 1903 and
1984, ranged from 50,000 to 60,000 acres (Rinella and Schuler 1992). An
average lake surface area of about 46,000 acres is considered normal (State
Water Resources Board 1967). Lake elevations increased to 4,102.5 feet in
1985 and to 4,102.6 feet in 1986. The drought of the late 1980s brought on
the recession of the lake levels by a foot or more each year to 4,096.4 in
1990. Parts of two highways, 57,000 acres of wildlife habitat, 25 ranches,
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and the railroad were seriously damaged by flooding (Rinella and Schuler
1992).
HUMAN FACTORS OF WATER POLICY
Malheur Lake Basin water resources are significant for both
agricultural and wildlife-related uses. The local economy has been primarily
based on livestock and forest products since European settlement in the late
1800s. This economic base is currently in danger of serious decline in
productivity, according to timber and cattle interests. Wildlife and plant
habitat throughout the region has been vastly altered by human activities
over the last 150 years (Reinhardt 1992). Recognized endangerment of fish,
frog, and bird species has led to attempts to better integrate human
activities with natural processes to ensure long-term environmental health.
Interests in agriculture and wildlife are represented in the local population
and also in the federal agencies that own most of the land area in the Basin.
The situation is complicated by the tension between state and federal
authorities over land and water resources, by private interests in the
Basin's environmental quality, and by the international character of the
Pacific Flyway of migrating birds.

66

Wildlife and Habitat
Primary wildlife values in the Basin include several large mammals
and a wide variety of migratory birds and waterfowl. Key large mammals
include pronghorn, California bighorn sheep, and mule deer. Key bird
species include the greater sandhill crane, the trumpeter swan, willow
flycatcher, and the redhead, mallard, cinnamon teal, and gadwall ducks.
Two national wildlife refuges protect populations and habitats of these and
other special status species: Hart Mountain Antelope Refuge and Malheur
National Wildlife Refuge (Figure 10). Both are administered by the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service. Efforts to protect and maintain adequate
feeding, breeding, and brooding habitat support the wildlife populations on
these preserves. Protected habitats include both uplands and wetlands.
Several types of wetlands habitats are important in the Basin. The
submergent and emergent communities of open water areas are critical to
bird populations. Sego pondweed, a dominant member of the submergent
community, supplies about 80 percent of the diet of all bird species during
migration periods. Periodic drying of ponds or lakes stimulates vegetation
growth for several subsequent years because this aerates the soil. The alkali
playa community includes very little vegetation, except around freshwater
springs, where woody shrubs dominate. However, shoreflies hatch in June,
providing a food source for shorebirds and waterfowl through the fall.
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Property Ownership in Malheur Lake Basin
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Meadows are important producers of grasses, sedges, and thistle. Meadows
are the preferred habitat for sandhill cranes, and also certain owls, ducks,
and hawks. Along streams and irrigation channels, dense, wooded riparian
communities occasionally arise. Some hawks, owls, and northern shrikes
prefer these areas (Littlefield 1990).
European Settlement Patterns and History
European settlement and agricultural activities, in the 1860s and
1870s, displaced the Native American residents and led to the degradation
of the native grasslands. A few early cattle-ranching enterprises reaped
high profits from the native grasses in the Basin. This livestock boom lasted
twenty years, and by the end of the century sagebrush and rabbit brush
were rapidly replacing the native grasses (Reinhardt 1992).
The fate of the grassland ecosystem was sealed when as many as
three million sheep grazed the Oregon high desert Basin early in the
century (Reinhardt 1992). Sheep graze grasses to the roots, ensuring death;
cattle, on the other hand, graze to within several inches of the roots. In
addition to virtually eradicating the grasses by feeding, grazing livestock
intensively degrades stream beds and increases erosion through trampling
and disturbance of vegetation and soils. Water quality is degraded by
animals defecating near streams.
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Nonetheless, the revised homestead act of 1909 offered 320-acre
parcels for $10 to promote settlement. Promoters portrayed arable, lush
valleys. The settlers instead met with harsh winters, floods, dry summers,
unseasonable frosts, and alkali soils. By the mid-1920s, few settlements
remained, and many homesteads had reverted to the government
(Reinhardt 1992). Roughly the same settlement patterns of the 1900s
persists today. Single-family ranches are thinly scattered throughout the
Basin, and most of the Basin's population of about 6,000 reside in Harney
Valley. Harney County grew from 2,559 to 4,059 residents between 1890
and 1910, and to a peak of 8,314 in 1980. However, between 1980 and 1990
the population in Harney County declined to 7,060 (U. S. Department of
Commerce 1913a; 1922b; 1993a). Agricultural activities, including ranching,
in the Basin have been fairly static for almost a century. In 1910, there
were 443 farms in Harney County; in 1992, there were 442 (U.S. Census
Bureau, 1913b; 1993b). In 1992, about 22 percent of these farms grossed
over $100,000; 19 percent grossed under $2,500. The remaining 59 percent
make sales amounting to between $2,500 and $100,000 annually (U. S.
Census Bureau, 1993b).
Conservation efforts were not altogether absent during the period of
settlement by Europeans. Malheur National Wildlife Refuge was
established in 1908 by the executive order of President Theodore Roosevelt
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as a bird sanctuary. In 1935 and 1941over120,000 acres of additional land
was annexed from two area ranches, bringing the total area under refuge
authority to over 184,000 acres. Water rights were acquired with the land
annexations (Rinella and Schuler 1992; U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
1992). Hart Mountain National Antelope Refuge was established in 1936.
The total area within the refuge boundaries is 277 ,893 acres. This includes
11,998 acres of state in-holdings, and 14,600 acres of private and county inholdings (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 1994). The Taylor Grazing Act
(1934) established a permit system for grazing that curtailed unlimited
grazing by sheep. As the sheep disappeared from the range, certain native
flora began to reappear (Reinhardt 1992). Under the Wilderness Act of
1964, millions of acres were recently reserved as potential wilderness areas
("wilderness study areas"). This prevents logging and development of
infrastructure (roads, power lines) on these lands, though some grazing and
mining are allowed to continue (Reinhardt 1992; U.S. Bureau of Land
Management 1993a).
Efforts by livestock interests to rehabilitate the depleted rangelands
have included fencing streams, removing sagebrush and juniper, and
seeding with wheatgrasses. Modifying vegetation fosters problems including
encouraging erosion, opening ground to invasion, and limiting habitat
diversity (Benyus 1989). These endeavors occur on both private and public
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lands, with guidance and assistance from the BLM (U.S. Bureau of Land
Management 1982; 1992b).
Governance and Policy Planning
In 1967, Oregon determined that no water remained under state
jurisdiction in the Basin, as supplies were over-appropriated (State Water
Resources Board 1967). No state plan for the Basin water resources has
been released since that 1967 report, which advocated structural
development for flood control and supply storage. The most recent relevant
federal agency plans were drafted and approved within the last five years.
Rather than restricting natural variability, these plans seek to manage
through simulation of the natural patterns of a variable water supply.
Such mimicry is still a method of control, however. Radical changes
in land use, such as condemning or retiring the farm or rangeland, are not
considered; even slight decreases in grazing allotments on National Wildlife
Refuge land lead to public outcry. The human struggle to carve a living out
of this Basin's uplands and wetlands continues, mostly through agriculture
(Figure 11), but occasionally, and increasingly, through tourism.
State Water Policy. Oregon has a history marked by increasing
emphasis on regional administration of water resources. In 1864, the state
legislated that miners could claim water rights (Oregon Water Resources
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Department 1992). In 1868, the legislature provided that landowners might
apply for county permits for draining wetlands, modifying stream channels,
and constructing flood control embankments. In 1891, the state defined the
first beneficial uses as irrigation, livestock, and domestic uses. Mining and
hydropower were added in 1899 to this list. The control of the state over
waters within its borders was formalized in the Water Appropriation Act of
1909, often called the State Water Code. In 1955, the State Water Resources
Board was created, which merged with the State Engineer's Office to form
the existing Water Resources Department. In 1985, restructuring placed the
new Water Resources Commission in charge of the Water Resources
Department.
Oregon's water law system is based on rights of prior appropriation
and also elements of riparian law, as codified in the Water Appropriation
Act of 1909. Water rights in this system are property rights. A water right is
dated, for priority, with the date the right was claimed. The right specifies
how much water, from what source (or diversion point), will be applied
where, for what purpose. The purposes must be beneficial uses. The right is
forfeited if it is not used at least once every five years. If water is in short
supply or over-appropriated, rights with the oldest dates are honored first.
Any water right can be transferred, if properly sought and authorized
through the Water Resources Department.
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Some surface and ground water uses are exempt from usual water
rights. For example, land owners may use spring water that originates on
their property and does not form into a channel that flows off their property.
Stock watering is also exempt, as long as surface water is not diverted for
this use. Watering of non-commercial lawns and gardens of less than onehalf acre with ground water is exempt. Industrial and commercial use of
ground water is exempt iffor a single purpose and not in excess of 5,000
gallons per day (Oregon Water Resources Department 1994).
In the 1967 Malheur Lake Basin Report, the state proposed a
comprehensive water resources policy and plan for the Basin. This plan, still
theoretically in effect, suggests that economic growth and concurrent
maintenance of wildlife goals are possible in the Basin. In order to strike a
better balance between these apparently competing goals, the plan proposes
construction of a dam and reservoir in the Silvies Canyon. The state and the
Army Corps of Engineers have both recommended developing the Silvies
River (Army Corps of Engineers 1957; State Water Resources Board 1967).
As noted previously, such development has not been undertaken. This is

apparently because of the uncertain effects on habitat for birds visiting and
residing on the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge (Wallsworth 1995).
The state recently developed a new drought policy. Because of a statewide drought in the late 1980s, Oregon's governor appointed an interagency
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Drought Council, which began comprehensive planning for future droughts.
The Drought Council is inventorying resources available to respond to
drought conditions and developing plans and procedures to mitigate the
effects of drought. Perhaps most importantly for Malheur Lake Basin, this
council has drafted procedures for simplifying legal water rights transfers
under drought conditions.
Drought becomes official when the governor declares an area to be a
drought emergency area. The governor is prompted to make such
declarations on the request of a county. Counties typically make requests
when the U.S. Natural Resource Conservation Service releases its
streamflow forecasts based on the snow-pack. By law, during droughts,
junior water rights holders would forfeit any rights to available water while
senior right holders receive their full allotment. However, one method used
in the Basin to manage dry years is temporarily transferring water rights.
In the past, this required applications for special permits and waivers from
the Oregon Water Resources Department. Since many counties are
concurrently affected by drought, this created excessive paperwork for the
Water Resources Department. The new procedures establish means of easily
and legally transferring water rights when drought conditions are declared,
thereby mitigating the impacts of drought (Norris 1994).
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Federal Water Policy. Federal agencies (the BLM, the USFS, and the
USFWS) hold most of the land in the Basin (Figure 11). These agencies
manage the water under their jurisdiction in accordance with their missions
and land-use objectives, and include water management plans in policies,
land use plans, and environmental impact statements. These plans each
typically consider several alternatives, generally in comparison with both a
preferred alternative and a projection of baseline, existing plans. Local
participation is encouraged through a public review process. While policies
are typically set to correspond to national goals and agency missions, policy
makers adjust plans in the review process to accommodate public objections
that do not compromise agency missions. The final decision to implement
plans is made by the particular agency's district officials, with regional
office approval.
The USFS has the least visible and least controversial role of the
three federal agencies in the Basin. In the northern Basin, 779,400 acres
fall under USFS jurisdiction. Responsible for the lands that provide
headwaters for the Silvies and Silver rivers systems, the USFS manages the
Malheur and Ochocco National Forests for multiple uses, including timber
harvests, grazing, recreation, and wilderness preservation. Plans are
subject to review evecy 10 years. The current plan for Malheur National
Forest was implemented in 1990, and the current plan for Ochocco National
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Forest was implemented in 1989. These plans anticipate few changes in
land and water use and management over the next ten to twenty years (U.
S. Forest Service 1991).
The BLM is responsible for the multiple use development of public
lands and resources, and also for providing sustained yields and enhanced
environmental quality (U.S. Bureau of Land Management 1986; 1992b).
The BLM Burns District contains two management areas, both of which fall
primarily within the Basin. The southern boundary of the Three River
Resource Area lies about 20 miles south of Malheur and Harney lakes, and
extends north beyond the Basin boundary. The BLM lands south of this
management area, as far as the Oregon border, are included in the Andrews
Resource Area. Most BLM lands in the Basin are rangelands. The
rangelands are managed within a system of grazing allotments for
consistent levels of grazing over time and for rangeland improvements.
Programs for rangeland improvements include riparian rehabilitation
projects and various rangeland vegetation improvement projects (U.S.
Bureau of Land Management 1986; Bentley 1995).
The BLM also manages specially designated areas. The Wilderness
Study Areas ("WSAs"), maintained for the time being as though already
designated, were first proposed in 1985. In the Basin, 21 of23 proposed
WSAs, covering a total of 1,075,337 acres, lie in the Andrews Resource Area
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(U.S. Bureau of Land Management 1993a). Two other areas have special
designations. First, part of the Blitzen River and several tributaries, a total
of74.8 miles of streams, became a National Wild and Scenic River in 1988.
Second, the Steens Mountain loop road, built beginning in 1930 and
completed in 1962, was to close in 1982. Because of opposition and
continued public use of the loop road area, this closure was never
implemented. In spite of protests appealing the continued use of the loop
road, filed by the Oregon Natural Resources Council, funds for improving
the loop road area were approved in the spring of 1995 (Bentley 1995).
Although the USFWS has an established national mission, the two
refuges in the Basin are managed somewhat differently. The national
mission, in brief, is to preserve, enhance, and restore ecosystems for all
endangered or threatened species, and to preserve migratory bird
populations (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 1982). However, the two
refuges have distinctly different physical landscapes and different specific
goals. Malheur National Wildlife Refuge, located in wetlands, emphasizes
protection of migratory and endangered bird populations. Hart Mountain
National Antelope Refuge, sited on a ridge, emphasizes protection of native
and endangered large mammals.
The management goals of the USFWS for Malheur National Wildlife
Refuge ("Refuge") are more single-purpose and visible than those of other
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agencies in the Basin. The Refuge mission stipulates maintenance of
habitat diversity, wildlife diversity, public use quality, and wildlife quality.
The principles set forth to guide management practices include an emphasis
on holistic, ecosystems approaches, native/indigenous species, and natural
processes, such as drought-flood cycles, fire cycles, and grazing (U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service 1985). Under drought conditions, the priority for water
uses is pond maintenance; during floods, the priority is to maximize water
use, while at the same time preserving emergent plant communities
(Wallsworth 1995).
Two areas in the Refuge allow for structural and developed
management of water with dikes, ditches, water-control structures,
constructed ponds and nesting islands, farming, grazing, and irrigation. The
area surrounding and including Harney, Mud, and Malheur lakes is
managed to closely simulate natural hydrologic processes (U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service 1985; 1992). In recent years, adjustments to plans have
been made to still more closely reflect natural processes, even in the
structurally managed areas (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 1994). Changes
to existing practices in the Blitzen Valley, for example, include decreasing
grazing permits by nine percent, and doubling hayfields (U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service 1990).
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Hart Mountain National Antelope Refuge ("NAR") was established by
executive order in 1936 and contains a total of 277 ,893 acres. All but the
steep west slopes of Hart Mountain and Poker Jim Ridge are contained
within Malheur Lake Basin. The current management plan, developed
between 1989 and 1994, will be in force through 1999. The goals of the
Refuge include management for healthy pronghorn populations, restoration
of native ecosystems, and primitive recreation and education (U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service 1994). In particular, restoration of riparian habitats and
eroded stream channels, and overall watershed stability, is of high priority.
The degradation of riparian habitats is attributed to severe, persistent overgrazing. Complete habitat restoration is expected to take 200 years. The
issue of livestock grazing on NAR lands continues to be controversial, as it
is throughout the Basin.
Interagency and Intergovernmental Conflicts
The most obvious source of friction lies between those who represent
the interests in water and land use for agriculture on one hand and for
wildlife habitat on the other. Both rely on water and conflicts over water
arise particularly during shortages. The most apparent tension exists
between the BLM and the USFWS. Though representatives of both agencies
acknowledge some tension, and the need for improved relations, rarely are

81
members of one agency included in development of plans and policies. For
instance, though one of the BLM's goals is to increase consultations with the
USFWS (U.S. Bureau of Land Management 1986), the USFWS was not
consulted in the preparation of the National Wild and Scenic River Donner
and Blitzen Management Plan (1992). Other agencies were consulted
including the USFS. This is in spite of the fact that the USFS lands lie over
forty miles to the north, while the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge
includes lands downstream of the designated Wild and Scenic River area.
Further, the BLM is subject to the conditions of the Endangered Species Act
of 1973 and has both Wildlife Management and Endangered Species
Management programs. Explicit mention is made of coordinating these
programs closely with the Oregon State Department of Fish and Wildlife; no
mention is made of the USFWS (U.S. Bureau of Land Management 1986).
Although the intent of the BLM programs parallels the intent of the
USFWS mission, it is as though the programs are competitive rather than
complementary.
Conflicts have also come up between Oregon and the USFWS over
Malheur National Wildlife Refuge. Following the establishment of the
Refuge, the state argued that "it had legal jurisdiction over those lands
within the meander line of all navigable bodies of water within the State,
including Malheur, Harney, and Mud lakes" (USFWS 1985, p. 18). The
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State was found not to have such a title to those lands in the mid-1930s,
upholding the federal designation of the Refuge lands.
During the 1950s, Oregon challenged the use of Refuge water rights
for wildlife habitat preservation. The water rights in question were acquired
with the ranch property annexations to the Refuge. Water rights in Oregon
are permitted for uses specified at the time of the claim. The State alleged
that the USFWS was not using the water for the uses stipulated in the
right. However, the USFWS was determined in court to be using the water
appropriately and the water right was upheld, rather than reverted to the
state (U.S. Bureau of Sport Fisheries 1962; Wallsworth 1995). Notably,
both conflicts between Oregon and the USFWS and between the BLM and
USFWS occur where one jurisdiction is geographically virtually surrounded
the other. Conflicts with private organizations and interests tends, on the
other hand, to occur when plans and policies are revised.
The opposition of environmentalists to the preliminary testing for
geothermal energy development at Borax Lake by Anadarko Petrochemical
is an example of private parties' resistance to changes in water policy.
Groups including the Oregon Natural Resources Council and Nature
Conservancy were involved in protesting the plant on the grounds that it
may endanger the rare Borax Lake Chub, a carp (Cockle 1994).
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Another example is the resistance of ranchers to changes in grazing
allotments and waterhole access in recent years. For instance, one rancher's
grazing permit for a Malheur National Wildlife Refuge allotment and
waterhole access was rescinded by the USFWS two years ago. The rancher
grazed and watered livestock on Refuge lands without the permit and was
arrested in August of 1994. The USFWS had decreased grazing permits on
Refuge lands over the previous several years, heedless of the objections of
the ranching community. BLM rangeland policies had also changed in
recent years. The arrest served as a catalyst for the dissatisfaction of the
ranchers with federal policies, and a large demonstration was organized in
support of the arrested rancher and in protest of changing federal policy
(Hogan 1994).
These conflicts have led to trade-offs and compromises in policy. The
agricultural and economic development interests have won some conflicts.
The idea of competitive bidding for state grazing permits was never made
into policy (Barnard 1994). BLM rangeland management and grazing
policies have been reformed over the last decade to include wildlife,
wilderness, and rangeland habitat protections. However, national rangeland
reforms proposed in 1994 that included greatly increased grazing fees,
among other stipulations, were largely successfully resisted by ranching
interests (Durbin 1994). The BLM was upheld in its development of the
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Steens Mountain Loop Road recreation area (U. S. Bureau of Land
Management 1993b). Anadarko Petroleum will certainly be developing a
geothermal plant near Borax Lake in the Alvord Desert, though the Nature
Conservancy bought the 10 acre lake (Cockle 1994).
The wildlife habitat preservation interests have prevailed in other
conflicts. There has been no major structural development of Basin rivers,
though this would be supported by many ranchers (Bentley 1995). There is
an increasing emphasis on wildlife protection and habitat improvement,
including rangeland improvement, by all agencies holding land in the Basin
(U.S. Bureau of Land Management 1992b; U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
1990). The relatively senior water rights of the Refuge have been upheld,
which is significant because Refuge lakes collect much of the run-off of the
Basin Wallsworth 1995). This means that negative impacts to Refuge water
must be considered by upstream water and land users. The authority of the
federal government over federal lands, established by the U.S. Constitution
Property Clause, has been upheld, allowing federal agencies to set locally
unpopular policy in order to fulfill their missions (Durbin 1994; Anonymous
1995). Although conflicts over water and related land use policy may
occasionally be severe, they seem to lead ultimately to policy trade-offs and
compromises.

CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS

This comparison evaluates each of the models to determine if they
provide useful frameworks for Malheur Lake Basin water policy. The
assumptions of both models are shown to be overly-simplistic and
unrealistic in comparison to Malheur Lake Basin circumstances. Further,
the objectives and methods each proposes to address their assumptions are
not useful for Malheur Lake Basin water policy. Because some objectives
and methods are no different from the existing system, replacing the
existing system with them in order to improve water policy makes little
sense. Other objectives and methods are simply not feasible for application
in the Basin. Finally, both models omit consideration of critical factors for
Basin water policy.
In particular, four areas are found to be discontinuous between the
models and the case (Figure 12). Feldman believes that water is not a
commodity and the capitalist markets are not the best basis for making
policy decision. Further, he considers participation in water policy processes
to be limited to narrow interests. The solution he proposes in
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FELDMAN
Water is not a commodity
Capitalism & markets are not good engines for
water policy decisions
Participation in water policy is too limited
Seeks a top-down approach: normative environmental
ethic and Social contract rules for decision-making to guide
watershed administrations
ROGERS
Water is a commodity
Capitalist markets are good engines for policy (if regulated)
Too many participants in water policy processes
Seeks top-down approach: centralized, federal
authority regulating water market transactions and
problem-shed administrations

MALHEUR LAKE BASIN
Water supplies are naturally variable
Two strong, persistent, sometimes conflicting priorities for water
Number of participants not as important an issue as the
identity of participants
Local resistance to federal authority, but reliance on
access to federal lands

Fi1n1re 12. Comparison of two water policy models and Malheur
Lake Basin, Oregon.
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his model is a top-down approach, with principles of a normative
environmental ethic and rules of a national social contract providing the
basis for water policy development.
Rogers believes that water is a commodity and that increasing
privatization and market strategies will lead to improved water policy.
Rogers considers the number of participants in water policy development to
be excessive. The model he suggests also offers a top-down strategy, with a
centralized, federal authority regulating water market transactions.
The circumstances surrounding water policy in Malheur Lake Basin
are significantly different than those in the models. Water supplies in the
Basin are naturally widely variable. Two strong priorities for water use
have persisted in the Basin since European settlement. These priorities
relate to the two primary Basin lands uses for agriculture, largely ranching,
and for wildlife habitat. The agricultural priority is driven largely be
economic concerns and the wildlife priority is motivated largely by
environmental concerns. However, there is no evidence that
environmentalism and capitalism are mutually exclusive priorities in the
Basin. The level of participation in the Basin by private parties is high and
both federal and state agents are also represented in Basin policy
development. Although the number of participants in water and related
land use policy is sometimes high, the identity and affiliation of participants
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with one of the two primary interests seems to be more important than the
number of participants. Finally, there is strong local reliance on public
lands for both ranching and wildlife, with a concurrent, and increasing,
resistance to federal authority.
For instance, numerous individuals and organizations with an
interest in ranching, and fewer with environmental concerns, attended local
meetings, one with Secretary of the Interior Babbitt, over recent reforms of
federal rangeland policies (Durbin 1994). Resistance to raised grazing fees
by ranchers throughout the West, similar to the resistance evidenced in the
Burns meetings, effectively blocked a drastic increase in the fees. An
acceptable policy decision was made with numerous participants. This
example also illustrates local resistance to federal authority.
Alternately, the establishment and maintenance of Malheur National
Wildlife Refuge and water rights has been disputed by the state and also by
local individuals such as the rancher who was arrested in 1994. Yet, the
rights and decisions of the Refuge have been upheld effectively, with water
policy decisions made by a single participant. First President Roosevelt
established the Refuge by executive order, and subsequently most on-going
decisions are made by the USFWS solely. These decisions have required
support of the courts on occasion, for instance when the state challenged the
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Refuge's rightful use of water allocations in the 1950s. Nonetheless, water
policy decisions have not led to frequent and obvious local resistance.
FELDMAN'S MODEL AND MALHEUR LAKE BASIN

Feldman believes that good water policy decisions are not based on
the market and that focusing on economic considerations in water policy
precludes the consideration of non-economic values. He recommends
replacing capitalism with environmentalism, and increasing pluralism in
water administration by establishing a new regional system. However,
Basin circumstances show that market-based decisions have not necessarily
had bad outcomes for either people or their environment. Further,
capitalism and environmentalism are not necessarily mutually exclusive in
the Basin. Finally, establishing a new regional system instead of the
existing state system of water law is not feasible.
Economics
In the Basin, the history of water rights appropriations determines
water allocations. This system of water rights originally developed to
accommodate miners' pre-existing method of making water rights claims. It
served, as intended, to encourage settlement and economic growth in the
state. However, this is no longer the case. Because water in the Basin is
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over-appropriated, it is possible that economic growth is functionally
constrained. While the population and agricultural statistics vary somewhat
over time, they nonetheless suggest that economic growth in the Basin is
limited.
Feldman does not model concrete strategies for assessing noneconomic values in making policy decisions in spite of his focus on such
values. In the Basin, non-economic values are considered and debated
widely. Ranchers are involved in rangeland improvements (Bentley 1995;
Bureau of Land Management 1986; Otley 1994). Ranchers have no interest
in worsening the already difficult conditions in the Basin. Many ranchers
deny that grazing degrades land and water resources and believe that wellmanaged grazing contributes to the overall environmental health of the
Basin.
Non-economic values were a factor in establishing the wildlife refuges
and other protected areas in the Basin. It is difficult to imagine that
revenues generated by visitors to the refuges were ever expected to be
sufficient to be a primary motivation for the designation of large portions of
public lands as protected areas. Although the actual motivations may have
been partially political, rather than strictly environmental, nonetheless
such motives led to serious and continuing consideration of non-economic
values in the Basin. Non-economic values held by residents and visitors
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alike include a sense of place, scenic views, and proximity to nature,
wildlife, and wilderness (Otley 1994; Wallsworth 1995; Bentley 1995).
Feldman fails to consider certain factors critical to Basin water
policy. Humans must, according to Feldman, live in harmony with nature
and accept nature's uncertainty. This does not account for people's practical
need for forecasting productivity levels, and does not provide for concrete
measures to prevent or compensate for losses from unexpected events. In
the Basin, forecasting availability of water each year can be literally a
matter of survival for some residents.
Law
One of Feldman's primary concerns is that water rights do not
balance water supply with demand. Also, water rights transfers, claims
Feldman, are not feasible under existing systems of law. Water rights in the
Basin indeed are not based on physical availability of water. A water right
allocates a specific amount of water for a certain purpose at a certain time,
rather than a percentage of available water for the best use given that
year's supply. However, some forecasting of water supplies is done by the U.
S. Natural Resource Conservation Service. While this does not have direct
implications for water rights (i. e., water rights are not affected by the
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predictions) such forecasting does allow users to modify their plans for that
year or to apply for water transfer permits.
Feldman claims that existing water law systems do not allow for
water rights transfers; this is not the case in the Basin. Water rights
transfer rules are being revised to allow for simple processing of predetermined transfers during times of shortages. These were always
permissible with an approved application to the State Water Resources
Department (Norris 1994; Bentley 1995).
Feldman also alleges that ground water is not treated adequately
under water law. However, Oregon water law has permitting rules for
ground water similar to those for surface water. Other than certain exempt
uses, such as domestic use, permits for use, as well as for digging wells and
holes, are required. Further, the expense of developing wells in much of the
Basin, for instance where the water table is at great depth, is a factor that
limits exploitation of this resource.
Politics
Feldman suggests replacing the existing system of state water laws
with a regional system of water policy administration to facilitate the
replacement of capitalism with environmentalism. Such a system might
resolve certain jurisdictional overlaps in the Basin, but the circumstances of
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the Basin do not uphold the idea that it is necessary to replace capitalism
with environmentalism. Environmental concerns are not necessarily
excluded from consideration in policy in spite of a capitalist economics
system. Non-economic, environmental values are considered seriously in
Basin policy and planning, as are economic values.
A main political concern of Feldman's is that all public interests are
well-represented in the political process. Interests that exist internally to
the Basin are well represented politically, and external interests also have
participated in local politics. Basin policy development is directly concerned
with balancing these interests, such as local ranching interests and national
and local interests in migratory bird protection. Those interests that are not
directly involved in governance are represented through private
participation in political processes, through committees, groups, and as
concerned citizens and individuals. Citizen committees have been set up to
advise both the USFWS and the BLM in developing plans and
environmental assessments. Private, non-profit organizations particularly
active in local policy development include the Oregon Cattlemen's
Association, Oregon Natural Desert Association, Oregon Natural Resources
Coucil, Oregon Trout, Oregon Watershed Improvement Coalition, the
Nature Conservancy, and the Sierra Club. Although there are often conflicts
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between interest groups, particularly over water and land use issues, these
have historically proved to lead to trade-offs and compromises.
Objectives and Methods
Feldman's primary objectives are developing harmony between
society and nature and establishing an environmental ethic that provides
for equitable distribution of resources. This objective is largely irrelevant as
a water policy goal for the Basin. Ranchers and wildlife preservationists
alike enjoy the natural values of the Basin landscape. However, the belief
that human society will exist in complete harmony with nature is naive and
unrealistic. Natural variability in water supplies and climate do not
encourage consistently harmonious relations between humans and their
environment in the Basin. Instead, as balances between various human
interests are wrought often as naught through conflicts, so livings are
earned in the Basin in a fashion also fraught with difficulties and
challenges. To ensure survival in extremely dry years, or to maximize
benefits and minimize waste in more moderate or wet years, water in the
Basin is sometimes redistributed using legal water rights transfers.
Feldman's methods focus on establishing watershed-based
administrations guided by a rule-based social contract. This would,
according to Feldman, replace the capitalist system, narrow interests, and
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property rights system oflaw and water allocations. However, it is not clear
that the regional administration Feldman proposes would look any different
from what already exists in the Basin. Feldman does not provide sufficient
detail to determine that his suggestion would have a truly different
outcome.
Feldman's argument that capitalism and environmentalism cannot
co-exist is not convincing given Basin circumstances; both so-called "ethics"
are well-represented in the Basin. In fact, individuals seeking to profit from
Basin resources also often have high regard for the non-economic values in
the Basin. For instance, many ranchers believe that rangeland conditions
can be improved with sound grazing practices.
In Oregon, the administration of surface water law is already based
on watersheds. Feldman does not clearly specify how water rights would be
re-allocated in his system, and therefore it is impossible to determine if
eliminating current water rights is either necessary or wise. Water rights in
the Basin date back to the early European settlers. Rescinding these rights
is not feasible and would threaten the livelihoods of many residents. Also,
improved equitability is not, as Feldman believes, impossible under the
existing system. For instance, water rights transfer procedures were
recently streamlined by the state to provide for more equitable and efficient
re-allocation during droughts.
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Although the watershed basins in Oregon are not independent and
distinct regions, the usefulness of replacing the existing administrative
system with such a region to increase pluralism is not indicated by Basin
circumstances. Even assuming that increased pluralism would be beneficial
and that it is feasible to replace the existing system, it is not clear that
Feldman's system would actually increase pluralism in the Basin.
Planning procedures require public notification and meetings, and
public involvement in developing Basin policy is high. For instance, recent
plans indicate those private interests involved as individuals, on special
committees, and through organizations. Agencies take private-sector
recommendations seriously and often adjust plans accordingly (U.S. Bureau
of Land Management 1993b; 1992a; U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 1992;
1990). It does not seem likely that replacing the existing Basin system of
overlapping jurisdictions, an involved public, and conflicting interests with
Feldman's regional administrations would increase pluralism.
ROGERS' MODEL AND MALHEUR LAKE BASIN
Rogers believes unrealistic public perceptions and expectations make
water policy decisions difficult and administration expensive. Accurately
pricing water and centralizing administration will mitigate the effects of
unrealistic expectations, claims Rogers. Basin circumstances support
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Rogers' suggestion that perception and expectations can play a major role in
water policy. Federal subsidization of public lands and water is expected in
the Basin, whether for the support of livestock grazing or of wildlife
preservation. Also, there is a perception that it is good policy to attempt to
control the natural variability of water. Such expectations and perceptions
may well add to the costs of water administration, and strictly adhering to a
long-term policy of accounting for complete costs and obtaining payment
from users is an intriguing suggestion. However, in the Basin, it is possible
that only the wealthiest residents would be able to afford water, whether for
agriculture or for wildlife habitat, if a strict policy of payment-for-use were
implemented.
Economics
Costs distribution in the Basin is not entirely in proportion to
benefits distribution; federal agencies maintain public lands and some
water on those lands but only local and state residents regularly use these
resources. Agricultural uses are by far the largest in the Basin. Farmers
generally pay for and maintain their own delivery, irrigation, and flood
control structures. However, the water-related costs accrued from grazing
on public lands in the Basin have not been quantified. Exempt water uses
can also be considered to be subsidized, by the state. For example, domestic
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use and stock watering using ground water is not subject to permitting rules
(Oregon Water Resources Department 1994). Those on city water supplies
are primarily domestic users. These are negligible users of the total Basin
water supply, and the water (ground water) is paid for by user fees.
Tourism does not generate significant revenues for agencies
administering the public lands where the tourism activities primarily occur
(BLM 1986; USFWS 1994). Further, most visitors from outside the Basin
are from within Oregon (Bureau of Land Management 1986). This means
that federal agency budgets are paying for benefits enjoyed by mostly local
and state residents. Federal and state subsidies spread the costs of water
and public lands among both users and non-users. However, it is possible
that without such subsidies the Basin would support far fewer residents,
both people and wildlife.
Rogers does not account at all for an area of crucial concern in the
Basin: the natural variability of the water supply. For example, he claims
water shortages result from inaccurate pricing, not droughts. He also
virtually defines non-economic values out of his model. Rogers believes
resources can be managed strictly as commodities, subject to primarily
market forces. Rogers' rejects a consideration of water as a public good.
However, treating water strictly as a commodity is not practical in the
Basin. Natural variability of water is often a serious public nuisance and
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causes occasional disasters in the Basin. Droughts and floods, and the
damage associated with these events, cannot feasibly be managed with
privatized and market strategies. Entirely private responsibility for water is
not feasible in the Basin if the character and current values of the Basin are
to be maintained.
Law
In his focus on the regulatory side of law, Rogers' says that ground
water and non-point source pollution issues require federal legislation and
leadership. Rogers does not explain how the federal government would have
legal authority to regulate ground water, which is technically under state
juridiction. The state of Oregon has been fairly progressive in developing
ground water regulations, and revised ground water rules in 1994 to strictly
regulte all drilling of wells and holes (Norris 1994). Also, non-point source
pollution from irrigation run-off was not found to be a pressing problem in
the Basin (Rinella and Schuler 1992). Erosion is a concern in the Basin,
because livestock has depleted deep-rooted vegetation in riparian areas (U.
S. Fish and Wildlife Service 1994); however, this is not included in Rogers'
model. In any case, it is not certain that the assertion of such federal rules
would easily lead state and local agents to implement those rules.
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Politics
Political issues Rogers' mentions include the lack of established,
acceptable water quality standards balancing public and environmental
health. Rogers' concern is that people's expectations for water quality are
unrealistic and that attempting to satisfy these expectations is costly. This
concern does not seem to apply to Basin water policy to date because
pollution is not currently a problem.
Rogers raises a concern about the maintenance and operations of
water infrastructure. These should be federally coordinated and adequately
funded, including costs of services as well as of structures, he claims. The
infrastructure for Basin water is in variable condition. The five wells
serving the cities of Burns and Hines are in good condition, and operations
and maintenance are completely funded by user fees. Although a plan exists
for strategies should draw-down become a problem, in the last twenty-two
years there has been no evidence of overdrafts (Collins 1995). Structures for
Malheur National Wildlife Refuge water controls are in poor condition
generally, with many control structures dating to the 1950s. Repairs are
made as funding allows (Wallsworth 1995). Private irrigation structures are
maintained according to individual budgets and preferences. Centralizing
the water infrastructure of the Basin does not make sense and is not
feasible. Federal control and monitoring of all local water infrastructure
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throughout the nation would be difficult, if not impossible, to establish. This
strategy would also only increase subsidization of supplies, which
contradicts other aspects of Rogers model that stipulate elimination of such
subsidies.
Rogers identifies many problems in interagency and
intergovernmental relations. Rogers' believes there are too many
organizations with over-lapping authority for development of good water
policy. Jurisdictions involved in Basin water policy do not coincide
geographically: the state-designated watershed does not coincide with the
BLM's Burns District, and neither of these boundaries relate to those of
either the national forests or refuges. Multiple agencies with different
agendas and geographic extents sharing authority over the same resource
can provide valuable balances and trade-offs. This has been demonstrated
in the Basin through conflicts over grazing rights, water rights, allocations
and use, and wildlife habitat and rangeland improvements (Barnard 1994;
Cockle 1994; Cockle 1993; Durbin 1994; Hogan 1994; Wallsworth 1995; U.
S. Bureau of Sport Fisheries 1962). Perfect consistency, geographically and
ideologically, may not be required for determining the best policy.
The centralized administrative system that Rogers proposes is not
likely to be feasible in the Basin. Centralization of administration does not
guarantee agreement on issues. Further, Rogers does not model the
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relationships between existing jurisdictions, state and federal, and the
proposed regional problem-sheds and federal water council. It is possible
that, even if increasing coherency and agreement on policy were desirable,
applying his proposal in the Basin would only increase conflicts and
bureaucracy.
Objectives and Methods
Rogers' objectives focus on economic and political reforms. He believes
beneficiaries should pay complete water costs in a privatized system,
organizational roles should be better defined, water policy should be set by a
central water authority, and public education should increase awareness of
issues. In Malheur Lake Basin, many beneficiaries and users of water
resources develop and pay for water and related infrastructure themselves.
Other uses are subsidized. A system of paying for complete costs of water
might not be practicable, and might prove to be regressive, in the Basin.
The resistance of local ranchers to decreased access to public lands for
grazing and stock watering, and increased fees for such access, is one
indication that eliminating subsidized uses is probably not feasible. The
interest of environmentalists in bidding for grazing permits and the
purchase of Borax Lake by the Nature Conservancy indicates that some
wildlife preservation would occur under a privatized system. However, the
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ability of this community to pay the complete costs of water and maintain
the existing land uses and economy is questionable.
Most agency roles are well-defined in the Basin. All federal agencies
released management plans within the last five years. The state has not
released a Basin-specific plan in thirty years, but has been active in water
policy in other ways, such as in developing new drought policies and
procedures and new ground water rules ..
Rogers believes that centralization and coordination will improve
interagency relations. The two federal agencies in the Basin that "get
along", the USFS and the BLM, are under the Departments of Agriculture
and Interior, respectively. The agencies that more typically conflict, the
USFWS and the BLM, fall under the authority of one department, the
Department of Interior. Clearly, centralization under a single federal
authority does not guarantee improved coordination if other conflicts exist.
In this case, conflicts apparently arise when jurisdictions overlap, especially
geographically, regardless of whether agencies are accountable to a single
authority.
In the area of improving information and education, particularly
directed towards adults, Rogers may have an objective that does not already
exist in some form in the Basin and that is not contra-indicated. Education
opportunities exist throughout the Basin, including sites for field

104
investigations and centers for dissemination of information. These
opportunities include the wide variety of Natural Study Areas (under
various jurisdictions), Wilderness Study Areas, Refuges, recreation areas,
and others. However, no aggressive adult education campaign exists that
might provide a means for bridging some of the gaps between ranching and
wildlife values. Since Rogers is adverse to subsidies it is important to
consider who would pay for such education and research programs. It is
likely such an education program is an inconsistency in Rogers' model
because it would probably require subsidies. Also, improving public
education might not be conducive to the centralized water policy system
Rogers seeks. Improved public education implies increased public
participation, whereas Rogers seeks to decrease the numbers of parties
involved in water policy.
Rogers' methods include establishing meaningful administrative
regions. Although the state-defined Basin boundaries do not coincide with
the administrative boundaries established by federal authorities, it is
nonetheless an arguably meaningful region, albeit one with uncertain
boundaries. The physical landscape and political and cultural history make
it a region with a recognized and distinctive character. Over time, the Basin
has exhibited stability. The economy changes gradually. The conflicts that
arise vary somewhat over time, but even these are based on many of the
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same issues and concerns that have dominated conflicts since European
settlement of the Basin. It is not clear that adding a problem-shed
administration to the existing complex of jurisdictions would add meaning
to the region. It is also not clear that it would be consistent with Rogers'
goals of consolidating and centralizing water administration.

CHAPTERV
CONCLUSION
Developing theoretical and philosophical ideals for policy is relatively
easy. It is more difficult to demonstrate how those ideals relate to actual
circumstances and still more difficult to provide a useful framework for
actual policy applications. Feldman and Rogers' models over-simplify actual
policy concerns, overlook crucial circumstances, and are not feasible for
application.
Feldman's normative model assumes capitalism and
environmentalism cannot coexist and overlooks historical facts contrary to
this. There are examples that these ethics coexist in the Basin, though not
without conflict. Feldman seeks social harmony through heightened
pluralism. Yet, the Basin demonstrates that well-represented, strongly
divergent interests lead to intense conflicts. Trade-offs are wrought through
these conflicts, but the conflicts remain. Feldman seeks a broad-based
environmental ethic and acceptance of natural variability and uncertainty.
However, he does not explain how to achieve this acceptance, overlooking
that people depend on predictable, consistent water supplies and that their
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environment can consist of extremely variable conditions, such as those of
the Basin.
Rogers, assuming economics factors are primary in water policy,
overlooks physical factors, which play a dominant role in water policy. As
illustrated in the Basin, non-economic values and concerns are considered
seriously in water policy development. Rogers also neglects treatment of
flood and drought events, which are prominent concerns in the Basin. His
recommendation of managing water entirely as a commodity does not offer
any strategy for managing these physical phenomena.
Both models propose a top-down approach to water policy and
regional water administrations. Feldman proposes replacing state
jurisdiction over water with watershed regions subject to a social contract.
Feldman assumes that an environmental ethic can be widely established
that would transcend differences and conflicts. Rogers' proposes problemsheds that overlay existing jurisdictions and are subject to a national water
council. Rogers' assumes a federal leadership role that transcends local
interests. Neither of these scenarios are supported by evidence from the
circumstances in the Basin. Establishing either of the regional systems is
not feasible given the existing intergovernmental and interagency relations
of the Basin. Feldman's system would require replacing existing
jurisdictions. Rogers' system does not clarify the relationship of his regional
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administrations to existing jurisdictions. In the Basin, two broad interests,
in agriculture and in wildlife habitat, have dominated water policy
development since European settlement. Given the level of resistance to
policy change, it is not clear that either replacing existing jurisdictions or
overlaying additional jurisdictions would be accepted in the Basin. Further,
neither model illustrates that its regions would be preferable to, or
particularly different from, existing states.
Feldman and Rogers are concerned with establishing an accepted
national agenda for water. Feldman seeks increased pluralism and public
participation in water policy; however, he prioritizes establishing a
nationally-held environmental ethic and a social contract of decisionmaking rules. In Rogers' case, public education is suggested to increase
awareness and agreement on a variety of water policy issues. He seeks to
manage water coherently through a federal water council and national
water policy. It is not feasible to establish such national agendas in the
Basin because of state water law. Further, it is not clear that decreased
conflict would be necessarily preferable in the Basin. Conflicts between
interests in agriculture and in wildlife habitat seem to have led to policy
trade-offs and stability in the Basin over time.
The fundamental disagreement between interests in preserving
wildlife and in preserving the ranching lifestyle is not likely to be resolved
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by a national agenda. These two interests can coexist, but water policy is
often wrought through conflicts and trade-offs. Water policy is unlikely to be
generated by getting everyone to believe an environmental ethic or to abide
by federal decision. The Basin shows that this is true for agencies as well as
individuals. Federal agencies exhibit tension in the Basin. The state
periodically resists federal jurisdiction over federal lands and federally-held
water rights. Local residents resist changes in federal or state public lands
and water policies.
While the Basin is unique in many ways, the issues and concerns
present there can be generalized to other locations. In particular, the
conflicts between agricultural and environmental values and the difficulties
with variable water supplies are circumstances that occur in many areas.
These are precisely the issues that the models do not accurately represent.
Neither model offers a framework adequate for considering natural factors
and physical variability of water supplies. However, in the Basin, natural
factors are a crucial water policy concern. Also significantly, neither of the
regional systems of water administration recommended by the models is
applicable to the Basin. It is doubtful, therefore, that the models would
provide useful frameworks in other locations.
These two models do not provide sufficient frameworks for Basin
water policy applications because they do not adequately account for and
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reflect the circumstances of the Basin. While models are necessarily
simplifications, the models considered herein suffer from extreme oversimplification. Model development is not necessarily a useless endeavor.
Ideally, models can provide applicable frameworks. However, in order to
provide useful frameworks for water policy applications, model developers
must closely consider the circumstances of actual water policy cases, rather
than idealize and debate theoretical and philosophical issues.
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